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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

Case No. 960384-CA

CONRAD STERKEL and
WILLIAM A. PICKETT,

:

Priority No. 15

Defendants/Appellants.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a Seventh District Court ruling, see
Addendum A, denying Appellants' motion to dismiss citations written
by Utah Division of Parks and Recreation personnel

charging

Appellants with violation of Utah Code Ann. § 73-18-7(1) (Supp.
1996). Appellants eventually pleaded no contest.

Under Utah Code

Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (f) (Supp. 1996), this Court has jurisdiction to
hear this appeal.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court correctly hold that the State of Utah

has general jurisdiction to enforce its laws within the Glen Canyon
National Recreation Area (GCNRA) on Lake Powell?
2.

Did the trial court correctly hold that to register boats

located within GCNRA the State of Utah may require payment of Utah
1

property taxes on those boats despite assertions that federal law
preempts such registration and taxation?
3.

Did the trial court correctly hold that payment of

property taxes on boats located within GCNRA does not impermissibly
interfere with interstate commerce or otherwise violate the Federal
Commerce Clause?
Each of these issues presents a question of law; the trial
court's decision is therefore reviewed for correctness by this
Court-

Utah v. Richardson,

843 P.2d 517, 518 (Utah App. 1992) .

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS
The U.S. Const, art. I, § 8, cl. 3 provides: "[The Congress
shall have the power t]o regulate commerce with foreign nations,
and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes;"
The U.S. Const, art. I, § 8, cl. 17 provides:
[The Congress shall have to power t]o exercise
exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever, over
such district (not exceeding ten miles square) as
may, by cession of particular States, and the
acceptance of Congress, become the seat of the
government of the United States, and to exercise
like authority over all places purchased by the
consent of the Legislature of the State in which
the same shall be, for the erection of forts,
magazines, arsenals, dockyards, and other needful
buildings;

2

4 U.S.C. § 105 (1994), a portion of the Federal Buck Act,
provides:
(a) No person shall be relieved from liability
for payment of, collection of, or accounting for
any sales or use tax levied by any State, or by any
duly constituted taxing authority therein, having
jurisdiction to levy such a tax, on the ground that
the sale or use, with respect to which such tax is
levied, occurred in whole or in part within a
Federal area; and such State or taxing authority
shall have full jurisdiction and power to levy and
collect any such tax in any Federal area within
such State to the same extent and with the same
effect as though such area was not a Federal area.
(b) The provisions of subsection (a) shall be
applicable only with respect to sales or purchases
made, receipts from sales received, or storage or
use occurring, after December 31, 1940.
46 U.S.C. § 12307 (1994), a portion of the Federal Boat Safety
Act, provides:
The authority issuing a number under this
chapter may prescribe regulations and establish
fees to carry out the intent of this chapter. The
fees
shall
apply
equally
to
residents
and
nonresidents
of the State.
A State
issuing
authority may impose only conditions for vessel
numbering that a r e —
(1) prescribed by this chapter or regulations
of the Secretary about the standard numbering
system; or
(2) related to proof of payment of State or
local taxes.
36 C.F.R. § 3.1

(1995), a portion of National Park Service,

Department of Interior, regulations provides:
(a) In addition to the regulations contained
in this part, Title 14 United States Code, Title 33
Code of Federal Regulations, Title 49 Code of
Federal Regulations, and the laws and regulations

3

of the State within whose exterior boundaries a
park area or portion thereof is located shall
govern water use, vessels, and their operation and
are adopted as part of these regulations.
(b) As adopted herein, Federal regulations
authorizing an action by the "captain of the port"
or another officer or employee of the United States
Coast Guard, authorize
a like action by
the
superintendent.
33 C.F.R. § 174.31

(1995), a portion of the Coast Guard,

Department of Transportation, regulations provides:
A State numbering system may condition
issuance of a certificate of number o n —

the

(a) Title to, or other proof of ownership of a
vessel except a recreational-type public vessel of
the United States; or
(b) The payment of State or local taxes,
except for a recreational-type public vessel of the
United States.
Glen Canyon National Recreation Area Act, 86 Stat. 1311 (1972)
(for full text, see

Addendum B, p. B - l ) ; and,

Utah Boating Act, Utah
1996)

(for full text, see

Code Ann. §§ 73-18-1

to -23

(Supp.

Addendum B, p. B - 4 ) .

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants were charged with failure to register their boats
as

required by the Utah Boating Act, Utah

(Supp. 1996).

Code Ann. §

73-18-7

They were convicted based on their no contest pleas,

4

see

Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-2(3)

(1995) .x

This timely appeal

followed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellants,

who

are

not

Utah

residents,

are

private

recreationalists operating within GCNRA in the same manner as other
members of the general public who recreate there.

They have

operated and maintained boats on Lake Powell, within GCNRA, for
more than ten years without appropriate Utah registration

(Sterkel

R. 2, 3; Pickett R. 36, 37). Because of the size of Appellants'
boats, the boats are more or less permanently moored at Lake Powell
in a marina operated by a GCNRA concessionaire.

Id.

In 1994, a Utah Division of Parks and Recreation ranger cited
Appellants for violating Utah Code Ann. § 73-18-7(1) (Supp. 1996),
which provides that "(e)ach motorboat...on the waters of this state
shall be registered, unless it is exempt from registration...." Id.
"Waters of this State" means "any waters within the territorial
limits of the state." Utah Code Ann. § 73-18-2(14) (Supp. 1996).
Appellants' boats are not exempt from registration under the
statute.

1

The State acknowledges that, as Appellants assert, these
pleas were entered conditionally, to preserve Appellants'
opportunity to withdraw the pleas if Appellants are successful
with this appeal. See, Sterkel Record (hereafter referred to as
"Sterkel R.") at 177/ Pickett Record (hereafter referred to as
"Pickett R.") at 116.
5

The procedure for registering boats in Utah is like the
See Utah Code Ann. § 73-18-7

process used for motor vehicles.
(Supp. 1996).

The required hull numbers are the equivalent of a

license plate.2
registration.

Property tax payment is a prerequisite for boat
Utah Code Ann. § 73-18-7 (c) (Supp. 1996).

In this

case, Appellants have failed to pay their property taxes and have
failed to register their boats in Utah (Sterkel R. 2, 3; Pickett R.
36, 37). They were charged with violating the state's registration
statute

and were

convicted based

on their no contest pleas

(Sterkel R. 177; Pickett R. 116).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Appellants

have

attempted

to

narrowly

frame

the

issues

presented to this Court, asserting that Utah lacks jurisdiction
over them only to the extent they are engaged in recreational
boating activities within GCNRA.

While Appellants' case arises in

the boating context, in reality the effect of their assertions
could be much greater.

Indeed, if Appellants' arguments are

followed to their "logical" conclusion, Utah's jurisdiction to
carry out many governmental functions within GCNRA

(some 1.25

A boat with a valid marine document issued by the United
States Coast Guard (a "Coast Guard documented vessel") is exempt
from Utah number display requirements, Utah Code Ann. § 73-18-7
(5) (Supp. 1996), because it has another means of identification
(hailing name and port of call on the rear of boat). Such boats,
however, are not exempt from state registration. Utah Code Ann.
§ 73-18-7(1) (Supp. 1996).
6

million acres) could abruptly vanish.

This is a large price to pay

to free Appellants from the responsibility of paying property taxes
on their boats as required by state and federal law.
Appellants make four arguments on appeal.

First, that the

State lacks jurisdiction to enforce its recreational boating laws
within GCNRA.

This argument fails because Utah has general

jurisdiction to enforce its law within GCNRA and has never ceded
any portion of that jurisdiction to the Federal Government.
Second, Appellants assert that Congress and the Executive
Department have preempted Utah from regulating boat registration
within GCNRA.

This argument fails because it ignores established

legal tests for determining exclusivity of federal jurisdiction.
It also fails because federal law expressly provides for precisely
the type of vessel regulation Utah implements.
Third, Appellants contend that national interests are advanced
by exclusive federal regulation of recreational boating within
GCNRA.

This argument is incorrect because no such interests exist.

Finally, Appellants allege that Utah's requirement of property
tax payment before boat owners operating at Lake Powell may
register boats violates the Commerce Clause of the United States'
Constitution.

This

argument

fails because

the boats being

registered and taxed have "come to rest" and are no longer "in"
interstate commerce, and because Utah's property tax requirement
creates no impermissible burden on interstate commerce.

7

For all of these reasons, the trial court's finding that Utah
has jurisdiction to enforce its boating regulations at GCNRA should
be affirmed.
ARGUMENT
I. UTAH HAS GENERAL JURISDICTION TO ENFORCE
ITS LAWS WITHIN THE GLEN CANYON NATIONAL
RECREATION AREA (GCNRA)
When Utah became
jurisdiction

a State

in 1896, it acquired

general

to enforce its laws on federal land within its

territorial borders, including the area that later became GCNRA.
See, e.g., Ward v. Race Horse,
v.

Walker,

163 U.S. 504, 508-16 (1896); Bacon

204 U.S. 311, 314-16 (1906); Kansas

U.S. 46, 89-94 (1907); Omaechevarria
(1918);
California

Kleppe

v.

Coastal

New Mexico,

v.

Idaho,

v.

Colorado,

246 U.S. 242, 246

426 U.S. 529, 542-43

Comm'n v. Granite

Rock Co.,

206

(1976);

480 U.S. 572, 580-

81 (1987) . Since statehood, Utah has not ceded any portion of its
jurisdiction over GCNRA to the Federal Government.
Limited
federal

cessions of jurisdiction have occurred

areas

in

the

State.

For

example, Utah

for some
has

ceded

jurisdiction to the United States over all lands within the limits
of the Fort Douglas and Fort Duchesne Military Reservations.
Code Ann. § 63-8-3 (1993).

Utah

Even within these areas, however, Utah

"retains concurrent jurisdiction, both civil and criminal, . . .
over [the] lands" and reserves to itself "the right to impose taxes

8

on individuals . . . in respect to . . . any property . . .
situated on those lands." Utah Code Ann, § 63-8-4 (1993).
Appellants contend there is exclusive federal jurisdiction at
GCNRA to regulate public recreational boating.

To attempt to make

their argument more plausible they obfuscate two issues, combining
them into one. For analytical and legal reasons, these issues must
be separated.

The first is whether Utah has jurisdiction within a

geographic area (in this case GCNRA) ; the second is whether the
State has jurisdiction to regulate a particular activity (here
recreational boating).
Richardson

v. Turner,

16 Utah 2d. 371, 401 P.2d 443 (1965), is

dispositive concerning Utah's jurisdiction over the geographic area
known as GCNRA.

That case addressed whether Dugway Proving

Grounds, a federal military base, was an area of exclusive federal
jurisdiction.

There, Appellants asserted that because the United

States always had a proprietary interest in the land underlying the
base, the withdrawal of the area from the public domain for
military

use

jurisdiction.

made

the

base

an

area

of

exclusive

federal

The Utah Supreme Court rejected this argument based

upon a three-pronged test.

The Court stated:

Exclusive jurisdiction over lands situated within the
boundaries of a state vests in the United States in one
of three ways:
(1) Transfer of jurisdiction pursuant to
Article I, § 8, clause 17 of the United States
* Constitution;

9

(2) By cession from the state to the federal
government
and
proper
acceptance
and
notification for the latter, and
(3) Reservation by the federal government upon
admission of a state into the Union.
Richardson,

401 P.2d at 444 (citations omitted).

that none of the conditions had occurred.

The Court held

If the proponents of

exclusive federal jurisdiction at Dugway, a military enclave, were
unable to validate their exclusive federal jurisdiction claims, a
fortiori

Appellants' assertions concerning a federal recreation

area also fail.
Indeed, regardless of the federal involvement at GCNRA which
Appellants describe, GCNRA meets no aspect of the Richardson

test.

Concerning the first prong, Appellants do not, and cannot, argue
that there has been a transfer of jurisdiction over GCNRA under the
"Enclave Clause" of the United States Constitution, art. I, § 8,
cl. 17, because no such transfer has taken place.
Concerning the second Richardson

prong, exclusive federal

jurisdiction requires a cession from the State to the Federal
Government, and an acceptance of that cession by the United States.
Federal law is specific.

It says:

[T]he obtaining of exclusive jurisdiction in the United
States over lands . . . shall not be required; but the
head . . . of an agency . . . at such time as he may deem
desirable, accept or secure from the State in which any
lands . . . under his immediate . . . control are
situated . . . consent to or cession of such
jurisdiction, exclusive or partial . . . over any such
lands or interests as he may deem desirable and indicate
acceptance of such jurisdiction on behalf of the United
10

States by filing a notice of such acceptance with the
Governor of such State or in such other matter as may be
prescribed by the laws of the State where such lands are
situated.
Unless and until the United States has
accepted jurisdiction over lands hereafter to be acquired
as aforesaid, it shall be conclusively presumed that no
such jurisdiction has be accepted.
40 U.S.C. § 255 (1994) (emphasis added).

Appellants allege no

facts to substantiate compliance with the requirements of this
statute concerning GCNRA, and none exist.

Federal cases have

interpreted strictly the steps that must be taken to comply with
this statute.

980,

985

See,

e.g., United

(2nd Cir. 1993) .

States

v.

D.K.

Johnson,

994 F.2d

In short, Utah has never ceded

jurisdiction over property, persons, or activities within GCNRA to
the Federal Government, and the United States has never accepted
such a cession.
Likewise, Appellants cannot meet the third prong of the
Richardson

test, because neither GCNRA, nor any reservation of

federal land related to it, existed when Utah became a State in
1896.3

Thus, Appellants fail each aspect of the Richardson

with respect to GCNRA, and Richardson

test

disposes of their claims that

GCNRA is a geographic area of exclusive federal jurisdiction.

3

GCNRA was created in 1972. Glen Canyon Recreation Area
Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-593, 86 Stat. 1311.
11

II. UTAH HAS NOT BEEN PREEMPTED FROM
REGULATING BOAT REGISTRATION WITHIN THE GCNRA
DUE TO ACTIONS BY CONGRESS OR THE EXECUTIVE
DEPARTMENT
Appellants were charged with failure to register their boats
moored at Lake Powell, within GCNRA, and were convicted based on
their no contest pleas.

Appellants assert that the Federal

Government exclusively regulates recreational boating activities
within GCNRA.

Appellants are simply wrong.

Federal regulations require a boat to acquire its number in
the "state in which it is principally used."
(1995).
where

33 C.F.R. § 173.15

The boats in question here are used principally in Utah,
payment

of

registration.

boat

Utah

property

Code

Ann.

tax
§

is

a

prerequisite

73-18-7(2)

(Supp.

for

1996).

Collection of such a tax is permitted under federal law.

The

Federal Boat Safety Act, which refers to boat registration as
"number issuing," provides that:
The authority issuing a number under this chapter may
prescribe regulations and establish fees to carry out the
intent of this chapter. The fees shall apply equally to
residents and nonresidents of the State. A State issuing
authority may impose . . . conditions for vessel
numbering that are. . . .

(2) related to proof of payment of State or
local taxes.
46 U.S.C. § 12307 (1994) . Utah is a number-issuing authority under
federal rules.

See 33 C.F.R. § 173, Appendix A (1995).

Guard regulations mirror the Boat Safety Act.
12

They provide:

Coast

A State numbering system may condition the issuance of a
certificate of number on-

(b) The payment of State or local taxes,
except for a recreational-type public vessel
of the United States.
33 C.F.R. § 174,31 (1995).
The Federal Buck Act, 4 U.S.C. § 105 (1994), recognizes the
States' authority to collect taxes in federal areas.

The Buck Act

provides, in part:
(a) No person shall be relieved from liability for
payment of, collection of, or accounting for any sales or
use tax levied by any State, or by a duly constituted
taxing authority therein . . . on the ground that the
sale or use, with respect to which such tax is levied,
occurred in whole or in part within a Federal area: and
such State or taxing authority shall have full
jurisdiction and power to levy and collect any such tax
in any Federal area within such State to the same extent
and with the same effect as though such area was not a
Federal area.
4 U.S.C. § 105 (1994) (emphasis added).

For the purpose of the Buck

Act, "sales or use tax" is defined, in part, as "use of tangible
personal property . . . ."

4 U.S.C. § 110 (b) (1994).

Federal regulations also support Utah's authority to register
all boats within their borders, including boats located within
federal

recreation

areas.

Current

National

Park

Service

regulations that apply to GCNRA provide, in part:
(a) In addition to . . . [federal] regulations contained
in this part . . . the laws and regulations of the State
within whose exterior boundaries a park area or portion
thereof is located shall govern water use, vessels, and
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their operation
regulations.

and

are

adopted

as part

of

these

36 C.F.R. § 3.1 (1995).
Against

this backdrop, Appellants were charged with and

convicted for failure to register their boats in Utah.

Unable to

successfully argue that Utah lacks all jurisdiction within the
geographic area known as GCNRA, Appellants attempt to mix their
geographic jurisdiction arguments with assertions that regulation
of recreational boating activities within GCNRA has been preempted
by federal law. Appellants are simply wrong in this creative, but
misguided, effort.
The United States Supreme Court has identified three types of
federal preemption of state law: express, implied
implied conflict.
Ass'n.,

See Gade v.

National

505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992).

Solid

field, and

Wastes

Management

Appellants allege all three, but

they fail to show how any one has occurred here, and none has.
When examining preemption issues, the United States Supreme
Court starts with a "strong presumption against pre-emption,"
Cipollone

v.

Liggett

Group,

Inc.,

505 U.S. 504, 523 (1992).

The

Utah Supreme Court has said "preemption analysis ^starts with the
basic assumption that Congress did not intend to displace state
law.'" Texaco,
(citing Maryland

Inc.

v. San Juan County,

v. Louisiana,

869 P.2d 942, 945 (1994),

451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981)).

To rebut

this presumption, there must be a showing that Congress' "clear and
manifest" purpose was to preempt.
14

Cipollone,

505 U.S. at 516.

While this intention may be express or implied, "it is not lightly
to be presumed."
(citing Greater

Texaco,
Wash.

Bd.

Inc.

v.

of

San Juan

Trade

v.

County,

District

of

F.2d 1317, 1320 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (citing Alessi
Manhattan,

Inc.,

869 P.2d at 945
Columbia,

v.

948

Raybestsos-

451 U.S. 504, 522 (1981)).

The burden is on the party claiming preemption to show a clear
congressional intention to oust the state from the exercise of
Texaco,

powers otherwise available to it.
869 P.2d at 945 (citing Wisconsin

Public

U.S. 597, 605 (1991)(citing Rice,
Mfrs.

Ass'n

1990)).

of

U.S.

v.

Abrams,

Inc.

v. San Juan

Intervenor

v. Mortie,

331 U.S. at 230/ Motor
899 F.2d

1315, 1219

County,
501

Vehicle

(2nd Cir.

When evaluated with these strong presumptions in mind,

Appellants' preemption claims fail.
1.

EXPRESS PREEMPTION OF UTAH BOAT REGISTRATION LAWS HAS
NOT OCCURRED

It makes no sense whatsoever for Appellants to argue that Utah
is expressly preempted from carrying out boat regulation activities
at GCNRA in face of federal laws and regulations that dovetail
precisely with the very type of boat registration program the State
has adopted.
At least three distinct federal laws or regulations expressly
allow for Utah's system of boat registration, including taxation of
boats, to operate within GCNRA.

The Federal Boat Safety Act allows

States to impose conditions for vessel registration that are
15

"related to proof of payment of State . . . taxes." 46 U.S.C. §
12307

(1994).

provide

that

United States Coast Guard regulations likewise
a

State

may

"condition

the

issuance

of

a

(registration) certificate...on...the payment of State...taxes."
33 C.F.R. § 174.31 (1995).

National Park Service regulations which

apply to GCNRA provide that "the laws and regulations of the State
within whose exterior boundaries a park area...is located shall
govern.. .vessels [] and their operation and are adopted as part of
these regulations."

36 C.F.R. § 3.1 (1995).

It is difficult to

see how any preemption argument can be sustained in light of these
expressions of federal law, especially when the strong presumption
against preemption is taken into account.
Appellants' reliance to the contrary on Shields
Marine

Corp.,

v.

Outboard

116 F.Supp. 1579 (M.D. Ga. 1991), is inappropriate.

Shields

held that state law is only preempted with respect to boat

safety

equipment

requirements, and then only when

directly conflicts with federal law.
Shields

See id.

at 1582.

state law
And, the

court explicitly said Congress did not "intend to occupy

the entire field of boat safety regulation."

Id.

To attempt to bolster their express preemption argument,
Appellants

cite

to

certain

Appellants' Brief at 7.

federal

agency

boat regulations.

But Appellants pick and choose the

regulations they refer to, and they cannot cite any regulatory
language explicitly preempting state law.
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The Tenth Circuit Court

of Appeals said, "[a]s far as results are concerned, neither the
Supreme Court nor this Circuit has found pre-emption by federal
regulation since Fidelity
explicit statement."

Federal

Integrity

unless the agency has made an

Management

Intern

v.

Tombs

836 F.2d 485, 493 (10th Cir. 1987) (citations omitted).

&

Sons,

The simple

existence of certain federal boat safety regulations, then, cannot
by itself establish an express intent by Congress to preempt state
law concerning boat regulation.

Consequently, Appellants fail to

show express federal preemption of state boat registration laws
within GCNRA.
2.

THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN FINDING NO CONFLICT
BETWEEN FEDERAL AND STATE LAW

The trial court correctly held that Appellants have not
"identified any conflict between federal laws and regulations and
the state laws in question here."

Utah v. Sterkel,

(7th Cir. Utah) (Addendum A at A-2) .

No. 9417-156

The court was correct that

conflict preemption does not apply in this case because: (1)
Appellants demonstrate no conflict between state and federal law
and

(2) the operation

of

state

law does not

frustrate the

accomplishment of any federal objective.
In United

States

v.

County

of Fresno,

429 U.S. 452 (1977), the

United States Supreme Court held that a county could tax the
housing of federal employees who lived in national forests located
within the county.

Id.

at 456, 457-68.
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The Court concluded that

state laws providing for taxation of housing were not preempted by
extensive federal regulation and management of the area where the
housing was located. By contrast, federal statutes and regulations
at issue here expressly provide for the very type of regulation and
taxation Appellants assert is preempted.4

Nor does the State's

boat registration law interfere in any way with the United States'
ability to manage GCNRA under any statutory or constitutional
provision.
Finally, a principle of statutory construction supports the
State's position.

The United States Supreme Court said:

When Congress has considered the issue of pre-emption and
has included in the enacted legislation a provision
explicitly addressing the issue, and when that provision
provides a "reliable indicium of congressional intent
with respect to state authority," Malone v. White Motor
Corp.,
435 U.S. at 505, "there is no need to infer
congressional intent to pre-empt state laws from the
substantive provisions" of the legislation.
California
Federal
Savings & Loan Ass'n.
v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272,
282 (1987) (opinion of Marshall, J.) . Such reasoning is
a variant of the familiar principle of expression
unius
est
exclusion
alterius:
Congress' enactment of a
provision defining the pre-emptive reach of a statute
implies that matters beyond that reach are not preempted.
Cipollone

v. Liggert

Group, Inc.,

505 U.S. 504, 517 (1992). A more

than "reasonable inference" can be drawn here that the Federal
Boating Act's express language precludes a finding of implied

While using their boats at GCNRA, Appellants are in no
way connected to the Federal Government or to the federal
operation of GCNRA. They are private citizens permissively using
the area.
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conflict preemption•

The very system Appellants claim is preempted

has been specifically approved of under federal law.

See 46 U.S.C.

§ 12307 (1994); 33 C.F.R. § 174.31 (1995); 36 C.F.R. § 3.1 (1995).
In sum, the trial court's decision that there is no implied
conflict preemption in this case is well supported by legal
presumptions, case law, federal statutes and regulations, and an
established rule of statutory construction, and should be affirmed.
3.

NO FIELD PREEMPTION EXISTS IN THIS CASE

Field preemption has not occurred in the present case.

It

occurs only "when the scheme of federal regulation is *so pervasive
as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for
the States to supplement it (.)'" Gade v.

National

Management

With respect to Utah's

Ass'n,

505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992).

Solid

Wastes

regulation of recreational boating at GCNRA, the question is not
one of "supplemental" authority, it is one of express federal
recognition of the State's authority to register boats, levy taxes
as part of the registration process, have the process (including
taxation) apply within federal areas generally, and specifically
within a National Park Service area such as GCNRA.
In Shields

v.

Outboard

Marine

Corp.,

776 F.Supp 1579 (M.D. Ga.

1991), which interpreted the Federal Boat Safety Act, and which
Appellants rely upon heavily, the court concluded "that Congress
did not intend to occupy the entire field of boat safety regulation
. . . ." 776 F. Supp. at 1582. A fortiori
19

Congress did not intend

to occupy the field of boat-use regulation generally.
Bay

Cruises,

Inc.

v.

Hirata,

861 P.2d

1

(Hawaii

See

Kaneohe

1993) .

The

Federal Boat Safety Act contains language allowing the States to
impose registration conditions related to tax payment.
§

12307

(1994).

significant

state

The Act's
role

for

legislative
enforcing

history

safe

46 U.S.C.

envisions a

boating

laws

and

regulations "directed at safe operation and use." S. Rep. No. 248,
92d Cong., 1st. Sess. 1, 20 (1971) reprinted

in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N.

1333, 1341. The Boat Safety Act and applicable federal regulation
argue against field preemption, not for it, as Appellants contend.
Appellants' Brief at 21, 22.
Appellants' reliance on various memoranda of understanding
between the State of Utah and the Federal Government is also
misplaced. Appellants' Brief at 22-24.

State and federal entities

have signed several cooperative agreements pertaining to GCNRA.
These are based upon the sovereignty of the governmental entities.
Nothing in a state's inherent governmental authority prevents it
from

negotiating

cooperative

agreements

with

the

Federal

Government, and nothing about a state's sovereignty prevents state
agencies from working closely with their federal counterparts in
regulating recreational boating and other activities, as is the
case at GCNRA.
must

depend

But, the notion that "any state action [at GCNRA]
upon

cooperative

independent

agreements

with

[federal]...agencies," as Appellants contend, Appellants' Brief at

20

p. 24, is absurd.

Indeed, Utah enters into cooperative agreements

with the Federal Government because it has the sovereign authority,
or jurisdiction, to do so, and not because it lacks authority to
act without them.

The cooperative agreements do not delegate

authority to the State.
Further, as a matter of law, federal regulation of the
Colorado River generally, and GCNRA specifically, is irrelevant to
field occupation preemption because the federal law and regulations
Appellants refer to have nothing to do with recreational boating.
Even if they did, the United States Supreme Court has said:
To infer pre-emption whenever an agency deals with a
problem comprehensively is virtually tantamount to saying
that whenever a federal agency decides to step into a
field, its regulations will be exclusive. Such a rule,
of course, would be inconsistent with the federal-state
balance embodied in our Supremacy Clause jurisprudence.
Hillsborough

County

v. Automated

(1985) (citations omitted).
also clarified,

xx

. . .

Medical

Labs.,

471 U.S. 707, 717

The United States Supreme Court has
it is appropriate to expect a . . .

regulation to declare any intention to pre-empt state law with some
specificity (,) . . .

we will pause before saying that the mere

volume and complexity of [an agency's] regulations indicated that
[it] did in fact intend to preempt."
Granite

Rock

Co.,

California

Coastal

Comm'n v.

480 U.S. 572, 583 (1987) (citation omitted).

Appellants do not even begin to show how the "field" of vessel
regulation at GCNRA is generally preempted by the federal laws
dealing with water storage and regulation on the Colorado River.
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It is critical to remember that United States Supreme Court
cases

narrowly

recognized.

define

Despite

instances

where

an "extensive

field

preemption

and comprehensive

is

set of

controls over ships and shipping" a local ordinance prohibiting
pollution from ships was not preempted.
Detroit,

362 U.S. 440, 444-46

(1960).

Huron

Cement

Co.

v.

Despite the extensive

federal role in nuclear power, not all state laws governing it are
preempted.

Pacific

Conservation

and Dev.

Gas

& Elec.

v.

State

Energy

Resources

Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 216 (1983).

Despite

far-reaching and complex federal mining regulations, California's
California

role in mining regulation on federal lands was upheld.
Coastal

Comm'n v. Granite

Rock Co.,

480 U.S. at 593-94.

Moreover, the difference between these cases and the present
action is that in none of the cases did federal law and regulations
specifically recognize and approve the state role concerning which
the preemption was claimed, as is the case here.

Put another way,

Appellants are hard-pressed to argue that federal law regulating
recreational boating at GCNRA preempts state law generally when
federal statutes and regulations expressly carve out for the State
the specific role Appellants assert has been preempted.
Appellants' effort to use Indian law to broaden the scope of
their field preemption argument is misleading and ignores the
narrow

scope

courts

have

Appellants cite Lower Brule

recognized
Sioux
22

Tribe

for

of South

such

preemption.

Dakota

v.

United

States,

711 F.2d 809 (8th Cir. 1983), a treaty rights case, to

support their preemption argument. Lower Brule

Sioux

Tribe was not

a case where dam construction displaced state jurisdiction, but a
case where dam construction did not abrogate treaty rights which
would have given the State jurisdiction over the area.
South

Dakota

v. Bourland,

Similarly,

508 U.S. 679 (1993), is inapplicable to

a preemption doctrine claim such as Appellants make here because
that case also involves Indian jurisdiction issues.

Further, the

tribe there was not deprived of all jurisdiction over hunting and
fishing in the area, as Appellants assert, Appellants' Brief at 19,
only the power to license non-Indian use of the land.

Bourland,

508 U.S. at 694-96. Use of Indian law cases, which involve tribal
sovereignty and treaty rights, to bolster implied field preemption
arguments is misguided.5

Regardless, there is no field preemption

here.
In sum, Appellants have not come within a country mile of
rebutting the presumption against field preemption.

In fact,

federal law and the actions of federal agencies show that the State
is free to regulate recreational boating activities within GCNRA.

If such an approach were appropriate, the State suggests
that Texaco, Inc. v. San Juan County, 869 P.2d 942 (1994), and
Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989), are
more closely related to issues at hand here, and would be more
appropriately cited than the Indian law cases Appellants cite.
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III. NO NATIONAL INTERESTS ADVANCED BY
EXCLUSIVE FEDERAL REGULATION OF BOATING AT
GCNRA
WOULD
JUSTIFY
CURTAILING
UTAH'S
JURISDICTION WITHIN GCNRA
No national

interest advanced by

federal management and

control of GCNRA would justify curtailing Utah's general tax and
police powers in this case.
Appellants, such as Hines
easily distinguished.

Cases relied upon to the contrary by

v. Davidowitz,

In Hines,

312 U.S. 52 (1941), are

the federal law at issue related

to foreign affairs, and any justification for a state role was
understandably weak.
Court,

however,

concurrent

in

312 U.S. at 62-63.
discussing

state power

that may

that

The United States Supreme
weakness,

exist

said,

"[a]ny

is restricted

to the

narrowest of limits; the statesfs power here is not bottomed on the
same broad base as is its power to tax."

Id.

at 68.

In the

present case, the power to tax is the precise power at issue.
Moreover, the Federal Boat Safety Act provides that regulation of
boat operation, including boat registration, was left to the
States.

See 46 U.S.C. § 12307 (1994).

The legislative history of

that provision makes clear that, "[t]he section does not preempt
state law or regulation directed at safe boat operation and use,
which was felt to be appropriately within the purview of state and
local concerns."
(1971), reprinted

S. Rep. No. 248, 92d Cong., 1st. Sess. 1, 20
in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N 1333, 1341.

The Federal Government has no pretensions concerning its
exclusive authority to regulate boating at GCNRA.
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The trial court

found "significant the absence of any federal participation" in the
proceedings below.

Addendum A at A-3. "The National Park Service

and the Coast Guard are apparently not concerned that enforcement
of Utah's registration laws would impair their effective regulation
of boating activity within GCNRA," the court said.

Id.

With this

in mind, this Court should not assume a conflict between national
interests and operation of state jurisdiction when none exists. As
United States Supreme Court Justice Kennedy noted:
Our decisions establish that a high threshold must be met
if a state law is to be preempted for conflicting with
the purposes of a federal act. Any conflict must be
'irreconcilable . . . . The existence of a hypothetical
or potential conflict is insufficient to warrant the preemption of the state statute.'
Gade v. Nat'l

Solid

Waste Management Ass'n,

505 U.S. 88, 110 (1992)

(Kennedy, J., concurring) (emphasis added) (quoting Rice
Williams

Co.,

v. Norman

458 U.S. 654, 659 (1982)).

National interests are not advanced by exclusive federal
regulation at GCNRA.

The "uniform body of federal law" applicable

here explicitly provides for state boat registration, see 46 U.S.C.
§ 12307 (1994), recognizes the authority of states to levy taxes in
federal areas, see

4 U.S.C. § 105

(1994), and applies state

regulations within National Park Service areas like GCNRA, see 36
C.F.R. § 3.1

(1995).

purposes

[federal]

of

Thus, it would not "unduly frustrate the
statutes

regulation," as Appellants assert.
fact, just the opposite is true.

to

permit

concurrent

state

Appellants' Brief at 25.

In

It would be contrary to national
25

interests for Utah's jurisdiction to regulate boating activities
within GCNRA to abruptly disappear.
IV. UTAH'S BOAT REGISTRATION REQUIREMENTS ARE
PERMISSIBLE UNDER THE FEDERAL COMMERCE CLAUSE
Left

without

any

plausible

argument

concerning

Utah's

jurisdiction to enforce its boating laws at GCNRA, Appellants' only
hope for success is to argue that Utah boating law violates the
Federal Commerce Clause. But Utah's boat registration requirement
for all boats operated in the State, including those within GCNRA,
and the related property tax requirement, is permissible under
appropriate constitutional analysis.
The Commerce Clause provides:
"Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o regulate commerce
. . . among the several states." Art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
Though phrased as a grant of regulatory power to
Congress, the Clause has long been understood to have a
"negative" aspect that denies the States the power
unjustifiably to discriminate against or burden the
interstate flow of articles of commerce.
Oregon

Waste

Systems

v.

Department

of Envtl.

Quality,

114 S.Ct.

1345, 1349 (1994) (citations omitted). Appellants concede that the
property tax in question here is applied equally to all boats in
Utah.

Appellants' Brief at 29. Thus, there is no discrimination

against out-of-state residents, and Appellants must show that the
tax impermissibly burdens the flow of interstate commerce.
In this regard, Appellants
requirements.

Pike

v.

Bruce

fail to meet

Church,
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Inc.,

even threshold

397 U.S. 137 (1970),

recognized earlier precedents that when a commodity "comes to rest"
it may be taxed without violating the Commerce Clause.
U.S. at 141.

See 397

The United States Supreme Court made the point more

clearly in Packer

Corp. v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105 (1932).

It upheld a

ban on billboards advertising tobacco products, saying:
[T]he prohibition is non-discriminatory, applying
regardless of the origin of the poster. Its operation is
wholly intrastate, beginning after the interstate
movement of the poster has ceased.
Compare Hygrade
Provision
Co. v. Sherman,
Shaw, 248 U.S. 297, 304.

266 U.S. 497, 503; Hebe
See also Corn Products

Co. v.
Refining

Co. v. Eddy,
249 U.S. 427, 433.
To sustain the
defendant's contention would be to hold that the posters,
because of their origin, were entitled to permanent
immunity from the exercise of state regulatory power.
The Federal Constitution does not so require.
Packer

Corp.,

285 U.S. at 110-11.

Similarly, the houseboats in question here are no longer "in"
interstate commerce.

They have been permanently located at Lake

Powell since the 1980fs, Appellants' Brief at 8, and have "come to
rest." A holding that property located in Utah for over ten years
cannot be taxed because such a tax would impede the flow of
interstate commerce and would call into question taxation of any
personal property in the State.
1.

THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN UTAH'S BOAT REGISTRATION
REQUIREMENTS AND THOSE OF SURROUNDING STATES DOES NOT
VIOLATE THE COMMERCE CLAUSE

Utah's imposition of different boat registration conditions
than its sister States does not violate the Commerce Clause.

The

assertion fails to meet the initial Commerce Clause requirement of
27

demonstrating a burden on interstate commerce. Pike,
Under Pike,

140.

effectuate

397 U.S. at

"[w]here the statute regulates even-handedly to

a legitimate public

interest, and its effects on

interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless
the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in
relation to the putative local benefits.'' 397 U.S. at 142 (quoting
Huron Cement Co. v. Detroit,

362 U.S. 440, 443 (I960)).

For example, Hawaii's rules regulating anchorage and mooring
privilege within its ocean waters and navigable streams that had
some effect on interstate
scrutiny

because

"the

commerce withstood Commerce Clause

only

effects

interstate commerce [we]re indirect."
1185, 1195 (9th Cir. 1994) .
Louisiana
commerce

port

district

survived

of

the...regulations

Barber

v. Hawaii,

on

42 F.3d

Port and harbor fees imposed by a

that,

arguably,

a "negative" or

impacted

interstate

"dormant" Commerce

Clause

challenge because the fees did not impose "^substantial' burdens on
interstate . . . commerce." New Orleans
Harbor

and Terminal,

S.S.

v. Plaquemines

874 F.2d 1018, 1022 (5th Cir. 1989).

Portf
The

difference between these two situations and the one presented by
the instant case is that there is no burden on the flow of
interstate commerce here, because the boats being taxed are no
longer in interstate commerce.
On the other hand, the State benefits from registering all
boats within its territorial borders. The law underlies receipt of
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state and federal funds to the State's boating program that, by
law, are distributed based on the number of boats registered in the
State.6

Also, the law facilitates tax collection.

The Federal

Boat Safety Act demonstrates Congress considered this a legitimate
goal of state registration laws because the States were allowed to
condition boat registration on tax collection.
12307 (1994).

See 46 U.S.C. §

Thus, Congress has approved of the very provision of

state regulation that Appellants assert impermissibly burdens
interstate commerce, and with such congressional approval any
Commerce Clause argument is very difficult for Appellants to
sustain.
The Tenth Circuit held "that 'the person challenging a statute
that regulates even-handedly bears the burden of showing that the
incidental burden on interstate commerce is excessive compared to
the local interest.1"
Comm'rs,
McCarthy,

Blue

Circle

Cement

v.

Board

of

County

27 F.3d 1499, 1511 (10th Cir. 1994) (quoting Dorrance
957 F.2d

761, 763

(10th Cir. 1992)).

v.

Appellants'

Appellees direct this Court's attention to 46 U.S.C. §
13103 (1994), which explains the federal formula for allocating
and distributing federal recreational boating safety funds. Utah
has approved systems for vessel numbering and marine casualty
reporting, see 33 C.F.R. § 173 Appendix A (1995). Thus, twothirds of the federal recreational boat safety funds Utah
receives depend upon the number of boats registered in Utah.
Likewise, under Utah Code Ann. § 59-13-201(6) (1996), the
Utah Tax Commission transfers an amount to the Boating Restricted
Account, which helps fund the State's boating program, based on a
formula that depends on the number of registered boats in Utah.
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challenge fails because, among other reasons, their brief is devoid
of any weighing of the alleged burden imposed on the flow of
interstate commerce versus the benefits to the State resulting from
the State's registration of boats at GCNRA.
Appellants also fail to show how Bib v. Navajo
359 U.S. 520

(1959), applies here.

Freight

Lines,

There, the United States

Supreme Court noted that compliance with one state's statute would
violate another state's statute.

No such situation exists in this

case, and could not exist because of the federal requirement that
a boat acquire its registration number in the state where it is
principally used.

33 C.F.R. § 173.21

(1995).

Appellants can

conform to Utah's registration law without violating any other
States' statutes or any federal law.
Freight

Lines,

Moreover, in Bib

v.

Navajo

the Court found very little benefit to the state and

a substantial interstate commerce burden.

359 U.S. at 525-27.

Any evaluation of the respective burdens in this case, if
Appellants chose to conduct one, would result in a conclusion on
Commerce Clause review opposite to the one Appellants erroneously
espouse.

The State receives a substantial benefit

from the

facilitation of the collection of taxes and the receipt of state
and federal boat program funds, while there is no burden on
interstate commerce. Appellants fail to understand that the burden
weighed to substantiate a Commerce Clause challenge is not the
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burden on them as individuals, but the burden on the flow of
interstate commerce itself.
2.

COLLECTION OF PROPERTY TAX ON BOATS OPERATED WITHIN GCNRA
IS ALLOWED BY THE COMMERCE CLAUSE EVEN IF IT WOULD BURDEN
INTERSTATE COMMERCE

In Oregon Waste Systems

v. Department

of Envtl.

Quality,

114

S.Ct. 1345 (1994), the United States Supreme Court stressed that it
is a "settled principle that interstate commerce may be made to
^pay its way.'"
v.

Brady,

Id.

at 1351 (quoting Complete

430 U.S. 274, 281

(1977)).

Auto

Transit,

Moreover,

Inc.

in taxing

interstate commerce there is no requirement that the persons being
taxed receive benefits equivalent to the tax.
Edison

Co.

v.

Montana,

Commonwealth Edison,

See

453 U.S. 609, 627 n.16

Commonwealth
(1981).

In

the Court upheld a tax although the appellants

alleged that they received two cents in services for every two
dollars paid in taxes.

453 U.S. at 620 n.10.

appellants' claim that Complete

Auto

Transit

The Court rejected

required the benefit

to be approximately the same as the amount paid in taxes.

Id.

at

621.
Here, the trial court correctly rejected a requirement that
there be a quid

pro

quo between tax revenues and expenditures.

Addendum A at A-3. The boats in question enjoy police protection
and other similar services provided by state and local governments,
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which is all the Commerce Clause demands for a tax to be allowed.7
See Commonwealth

Edison,

453 U.S. at 627. Moreover, Utah law has

provided for many years that it is permissible to tax property
involved in interstate commerce.
Lynch,

Union Refrigerator

Transit

55 P. 639, 641 (Utah 1898) (citing Pulman's

v. Pennsylvania,

Co.

Palace-Car

v.
Co.

141 U.S. 18) . Thus, nothing in either the Utah or

United States Constitutions prohibits the tax here.
Additionally, in Union Refrigerator

Transit

Co. v. Lynch,

55

P. 639 (Utah 1898), the Utah Supreme Court stated, "in order that
property may be subjected to taxation, it is not a requisite that
the owner should reside in the state; and this is true as to
personal property, tangible or intangible, as well as real."
at 640.

Id.

Thus, Appellants' status as non-Utah residents having

property taxed by the State does not raise Utah constitutional
issues.

Their residency is also unimportant under the Federal

Constitution.

See Connecticut

Limousine

Service,

248 A.2d 578, 579 (Conn. 1966) (citing Pullman's
Twombly,

Brady,

v.

Palace-Car

Sullivan,
Co.

v.

C.C., 29 F. 658).

Furthermore, the rule adopted in Complete
v.

Inc.

430 U.S. 274

(1977),

validates

Auto

Transit,

the property

Inc.
tax

There are numerous other state and locally provided
services which Appellants and other members of the public enjoy
at GCNRA, such as law enforcement, search and rescue protection,
highway maintenance, gas pump calibration, inspection of food
service establishments, and ferry operation, just to name a few.
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implicated in this case under Commerce Clause analysis. Appellants
correctly point out that the Commerce Clause imposes a substantial
nexus requirement on a state's ability to tax an out-of-state
entity.

Quill

Corp.

v.

North

Dakota,

504 U.S. 298, 315 (1992).

Appellants' Brief at 34. This requirement is satisfied here by the
taxpayers' activities and the physical presence of their boats in
Utah.

See Quill,

504 U.S. at 314-315.

Also, the trial court correctly concluded:
Property taxes are collected to support the general
function of government, not the enforcement of particular
laws. The State of Utah has an obligation to provide
general government services, such as law enforcement,
social services, and education, within GCNRA. It is not
required to demonstrate a direct quid pro quo
relationship between revenues and expenditures.
The
Commerce Clause claim must therefore fail as well.
Addendum A at A-3 (emphasis in original).
Corp. v. New Mexico,

In Cotton

Petroleum

490 U.S. 163 (1989), the United States Supreme

Court said, in upholding the collection of state taxes on an Indian
reservation, an area where the State asserts there are more
questions about the exercise of its jurisdiction than there are
within GCNRA, "there is no constitutional requirement that the
benefits received from a taxing authority by an ordinary commercial
taxpayer—or by those living in the community where the taxpayer is
located—must equal the amount of its tax obligations."

Id.

at

180.
In sum, the tax involved in this case does not implicate
interstate commerce because the boats being taxed have "come to
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rest."

They are no longer "in" commerce.

In the alternative, the

"burden" placed on the flow of interstate commerce by Utah's
registration of boats at GCNRA, if any, is de minimus

and, in any

case, does not outweigh the known benefits to the State that arise
from the process. Moreover, there is no problem with the tax under
the Utah Constitution.
CONCLUSION
Utah has jurisdiction to enforce its laws within GCNRA.

It

acquired that jurisdiction when it became a State in 1896, and has
not

ceded

Government.
preempted.

any portion
Utah's

of

that

boating

jurisdiction

registration

law

to

the

has

Federal

not

been

Neither expressed, field, nor conflict preemption can

be shown here. Since those are the only methods recognized by the
United States Supreme Court for federal law to preempt state law,
no preemption could have possibly occurred in this case.
Appellants' contention that the Commerce Clause prohibits
Utah's boat

registration

laws has

even

less merit.

First,

Appellants have failed to show how the Commerce Clause has been
implicated here in the first instance.

For the Commerce Clause to

be applicable, the State's law must be discriminatory or must
burden the flow of interstate commerce.

Implementation of Utah's

boat registration laws at GCNRA does neither.
Moreover, the property tax on the houseboats, which has always
been the true target of this suit, is valid.
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The tax is applied to

an activity with a substantial nexus to the State, is fairly
apportioned, and does not discriminate against interstate commerce.
Therefore, the State requests this Court to affirm the trial
court's holding that Utah has jurisdiction to enforce its laws,
particularly the Utah Boating Act, within GCNRA and to affirm the
convictions below.
DATED this 25th day of October, 1996.
JAN GRAHAM, No. 1231
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL

MIOHAEL MV QUEALY, No. 2667
NORM^N/K. JOHNSON, No. 3816
Assistant Attorneys General
ATTORNEYS FOR STATE OF UTAH
1594 West North Temple, #300
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84116
Telephone: (801) 538-7227
CRAIG C. HALLS
San Juan County Attorney
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

RULING ON MOTION
TO DISMISS

Plaintiff,
vs.
CONRAD STERKEL, MEL G. CAHO,
WILLIAM A- PICKETT, ALAN L.
HERMAN,
Defendant.

Case No, 9417-156, 9417172, 9417-197, and 9417-200

Defendants in these cases have moved to dismiss the charges
filed against them for failing to register their boats.
demonstrated,

and

the

state

concedes,

that

the

Each has

boats

were

maintained and operated within the confines of the Glen Canyon
National Recreation Area ("GCNRA"),
The court has reviewed all of the memoranda filed by counsel.
After

initially

requesting

defendants notified

oral

the court

argument,

on January

counsel

for

the

29, 1996, that oral

argument was waived.
Defendants maintain that the land within GCNRA is exclusively
within the jurisdiction of the United States and that the laws of
the State of Utah are without any force there.

Alternatively, if

there is some state jurisdiction within GCNRA it cannot extend to
requiring defendants to register and pay taxes on their boats
located there.

A-l

Defendants have failed to persuade the court that Congress
intended to divest the State of Utah generally of its power to
enforce state laws within GCNRA.

They have not identified any

express legislative language effecting a divestiture.

Absent any

express statement, the court has no need to determine if Congress
has

the

power

to

divest

Utah

of

jurisdiction.

Utah

has

jurisdiction to enforce its laws except as preempted by Congress
exercising its powers under the Property Clause.
The state concedes that, even though federal jurisdiction over
GCNRA is not exclusive, Congress has the power under the Property
Clause to preempt state laws that interfere with federal regulation
of federal property.
need

not

be

evident.

The state also concedes that such preemption

explicit,

Since

if

interference

defendants

have

not

with

federal

identified

any

goals

is

explicit

congressional preemption of the state's boating registration laws,
their

preemption
Defendants

claim

have

must

rest

demonstrated

on

actual

that

federal

interference.
regulation

boating activity within GCNRA is extensive, even pervasive.

of

They

have not, however, identified any conflict between federal laws and
regulations and the state laws in question here.
this

court

questioned

understands
state

it,

law would

federal laws or regulations.
such

interference.

registration —

They

is

whether

prevent

or

The question, as

compliance

impede

with

compliance

the
with

Defendants have not identified any
suggest

and related taxation —

that

enforcement

of

the

requirements of Utah law

may discourage them from leaving their boats at GCNRA, discourage
A- 2

boating within GCNRA, or encourage some owners to change the place
of

mooring.

insubstantial.

Those

effects

are

speculative,

remote

and

The court declines to rest a finding of preemption

on so weak a reed.
In

considering

the

preemption

claim,

the

court

significant the absence of any federal participation
actions.

finds

in these

The National Park Service and the Coast Guard

are

apparently not concerned that enforcement of Utah / s registration
laws would impair their effective regulation of boating activity
within GCNRA.
Finally, the court
argument of defendants.

addresses the related

Commerce

Clause

While related to the preemption claim, it

is separate and based upon the theory that state taxation has
limits.

Defendants claim that the taxes that they must pay in

order to register their boats are not fairly related to services
provided within GCNRA.
Defendants mistake the purpose of property taxes.

Property

taxes are collected to support the general function of government,
not the enforcement of particular laws.

The State of Utah has an

obligation to provide general government services, such as law
enforcement, social services, and education, within GCNRA.

It is

not required to demonstrate a direct quid pro quo relationship
between revenues and expenditures.
therefore fail as well.

A-3

The Commerce Clause claim must

Defendants' motion to dismiss

is denied. The parties are

directed to appear before the court on February 29, 1996, at 9:30
a.m. to set their trial dates and address any additional pre-trial
issues.

DATED the

litof January, 1996,
/

District Court Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I mailed a copy of the RULING ON MOTION TO DISMISS, postage
prepaid, this J ^ L _ d a Y o f 4 J ^ W ^
1996, to the following:
Mr. R. Dennis Ickes
Attorney for Defendants
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

Craig C. Halls
San Juan County Attorney
P.O. Box 850
Monticello, UT 84535

&

us

i (I

Deputy Court Clerk
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PUBLIC LAW 92-593-OCT. 27, 1972

(,j) three membcro to be appointed by the Sodratary to rcprcjont
^>the general public.
( c ) j E ^ e Secretary shall designate one member to be Chairman. Any
acancy i r ^ e Commission shall be filled in the same manner in which
le original appointment was made.
l
(d) A memberbf^he Commission shall serve without compensation
s such. The SecretarKjs authorized to pay the expenses reasonably
lcurred by the Commission in carrying out its responsibility under
his Act upon vouchers signecrbs^the Chairman.
•(e) The Commission e s t a b l i s h e d ^ this section shall act and advise
y affirmative vote of a majority of tnts^nembers thereof.
(f) The Secretary or his designee shafis^rom time to time, consult
rith the members of the Commission with respect to matters relating
3 the development of the recreation area.
^s.
SEC. 5. There are hereby authorized to be appropriated such sums
s may be necessary to carry out the provisions of thisS^ct, but not
lore than $12,125,000 for the acquisition of lands and i m ^ e s t s in
inds and not more than $92,813,000 (July, 1971 prices) for de>fel<x>lent of the recreation area, plus or minus such amounts, if any, a^s
lay be justified by reason of ordinary fluctuations in the construction
osts as indicated oy engineering cost indices applicable to the type of
anstruction involved herein.
Appiinud Oitobci' 57, 1Q7S.

Chairman

Expenses.

Appropriation.

Public Law 92-593
AN A C T

October 27, 1972

To establish the Glen Canyon National Recreation Area in the States of Arizona
and Utah.

£s-

27

)

* Be it enacted by the Senate and Home of Representative* of the
United States of America in Congress axxembled, That in order to den canyon
provide for public outdoor recreation use and enjoyment of Lake non^ea*^* 3 .*
Powell and lands adjacent thereto in the States of Arizona and Utah Utah.re
Uid to preserve scenic, scientific, and historic features contributing
Establishment.
to public enjoyment of the area, there is established the Glen Canyon
National Recreation Area (hereafter referred to as the ''recreation
area") to comprise the area generally depicted on the drawing entitled
^Boundary Map Glen Canyon Xational Recreation A r e a / ' numbered
GLC-91,006 and dated August 1972, which is on file and available
for public inspection in the office of the National P a r k Service, Department of the Interior. The Secretary of the Interior (hereafter referred F^,ePduebr lailc aRt ieogni s -in
to as the "Secretary") may revise the boundaries of the recreation area ter.
from time to time by publication in thp Federal Register of a revised
drawing or other boundary description, but the total acreage of the
National recreation area may not exxccd one million two hundred and
thirty-six thousand eight hundred and eighty acres.
Land a c q u i s i SEC. 2. (a) Within the boundaries of the recreation area, the Secre- tion.
tary may acquire lands and interests in lands by donation, purchase1, or
exchange. Any lands owned by the States of Utah or Arizona, or any
State, political subdivisions thereof, may be acquired only by donation
or
exchange. No lands held in trust for any Indian tribe may be
Acquired except with the concurrence of the tribal council.
„-(b) Nothing in this Act shall IK? construed to affect the mineral Limitation.
Sights reserved to the Navajo Indian Tribe under section 2 of the Act
Of September 2, 1958 (72 Stat. l(>8tt). or the rights reserved to the
Aavajo Indian Tribal Council in said section 2 with respect to the use
°f the lands there described under the heading "PARCEL IV.
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Public lands,
withdrawal.

64 Stat. 463.

41 Stat. 437;
74 Stat. 790.
61 Stat. 913.

Funds, disposition.

Administration.

70 Stat. 105.
43 USC 620.

Hunting and
fishing.

Leases.

Easements and
rights-of-way.

Proposed road,
study.

PUBLIC LAW 92-593-OCT. 27, 1972

[86 STAT;

SEC. 3. (a) The lands within the recreation area, subject to valid
existing rights, are withdrawn from location, entry, and patent Hinder^
the United States mining laws. Under such regulations as he deems'
appropriate, the Secretary shall permit the removal of the nonleasabfe
minerals from lands or interests in lands within the national recreation^
area in the manner prescribed bv section 10 of the Act of August 4,
1939, as amended (:>3 Stat. 1196; 43 U.S.C 387 et seq.), and he shall
permit the removal of leasable minerals from lands or interests in
lands within the recreation area in accordance with the Mineral Leasing Act of February 25, 1920, as amended (30 U.S.C. 181 et seq.) or
the Acquired Lands Mineral Leasing Act of August 7,1947 (30 U.S.C.
351 et seq.). if he finds that such disposition would not have significant
adverse effects on the Glen Canyon project or on the administration
of the national recreation area pursuant to this Act.
(b) All receipts derived from permits and leases issued on landsaij
the recreation area under the Mineral Leasing Act of February i}§|
1920, as amended, or the Act of August 7, 1947, shall be disposed $ 1
as provided in the applicable Act; and receipts from the dispositic^
of nonleasable minerals within the recreation area shall be disposedi'
of in the same manner as moneys received from the sale of public lands*'
SEC. 4. The Secretary shall administer, protect, and develop t h e . n ^
reation area in accordance with the provisions of the Act of A u g u s t ^
1916 (39 Stat. 535; 16 U . S . C 1 et seq.), as amended and supplemented^
and with any other statutory authority available to him for the con^
servation and management of natural resources to the extent he finds
such authority will further the purposes of this Act: Provided, hopj~A
ever, That nothing in this Act shall affect or interfere with th$
authority of the Secretary granted by Public Law 485, E i g h t y - f o ^ ^
Congress, second session, to operate Glen Canyon Dam and ReserV^i
in accordance with the purposes of the Colorado River Storage P r o j ^
Act for river regulation, irrigation, flood control, and generation"^
hydroelectric power.
SEC. 5. The Secretary shall permit hunting, fishing, and t r a p p i n g ^
lands and waters under his jurisdiction within the boundaries of ^ ^
recreation area in accordance with applicable laws of the United S t a p i
and the States of Utah and Arizona, except that the Secretary m&y
designate zones where, and establish periods when, no hunting, fishing;
or trapping shall be permitted for reasons of public safety, administrate
tion, or public use and enjoyment. Except in emergencies, any regiJBS
tion of the Secretary pursuant to this section shall be put into effect
only after consultation with the appropriate State fish and g a m |
department.
S E C 6. The administration of mineral and grazing leases within tfi|
recreation area shall be by the Bureau of Land Management. The same
policies followed by the Bureau of Land Management in issuing and
administering mineral and grazing leases on other lands under its
jurisdiction shall be followed in regard to the lands within the
boundaries of the recreation area, subject to the provisions of sections
3(a) and 4 of this Act.
SEC. 7. The Secretary shall grant easements and rights-of-way on a
nondiscriminatory basis upon, over, under, across, or along any component of the recreation area unless he finds that the route of such
easements and rights-of-way would have significant adverse effects
on the administration of the recreation area.
SEC. 8. (a) The Secretary together with the Highway Department
of the State of Utah, shall conduct a study of proposed road alinements within and adjacent to the recreation area. Such study shall
locate the specific route of a scenic, low-speed road, hereby authorized,
from Glen Canyon City to Bullfrog Basin, crossing the Escalante
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River south of the point where the river has entered Lake Powell
when the lake is at the three thousand seven hundred-foot level. I n
determining the route for this road, special care shall be taken to
minimize any adverse environmental impact and said road is not
required to meet ordinary secondary road standards as to grade,
alinement, and curvature. Turnouts, overlooks, and scenic vistas may
be included in the road plan. I n no event shall said route cross the
Escalante River north of Stephens Arch.
(b) The studv shall include a reasonable timetable for the engineer- Construction.
ing, planning, and construction of the road authorized in section 8(a)
and the Secretary of the Interior shall adhere to said timetable in every
wav feasible to him.
(c) The Secretary is authorized to construct and maintain markers
and other interpretive devices consistent with highway safety
standards.
Additions]
(d) The study specified in section 8(a) heitsof shall designate what roads.
additional roads are appropriate and necessary for full utilization of
the area for the purposes of this Act and to connect with all roads of
ingress to, and egress from the recreation area.
to Con(e) The findings and conclusions of the Secretary and the Highway g rReport
ess.
Department of the State of Utah, specified in section 8 ( a ) , shall be
submitted to Congress within two years of the date of enactment of
this Act, and shall include recommendations for any further legislation necessary to implement the findings and conclusions. I t shall
specify the funds necessary for appropriation in order to meet the
timetable fixed in section 8 ( b ) .
Report to Pre si*
SEC. 9. Within two years from the date of enactment of this Act, dent.
the Secretary shall report to the President, in accordance with subsections 3(c) and 3(d) of the Wilderness Act (78 S t a t 890j 16 U.S.C.
1132 (c) and ( d ) ) , his recommendations as to the suitability or nonsuitability of any area within the recreation area for preservation
as wilderness, and any designation of any such area as wilderness
16 USC 1131
shall be in accordance with said Wilderness Act.
note.
SEC. 10. There are hereby authorized to be appropriated such sums Appropriation.
as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act, not to
exceed, however, $400,000 for t h e acquisition of lands and interests
in lands and not to exceed $37,325,400 for development The sums
authorized in this section shall be available for acquisition and development undertaken subsequent to the approval of this A c t
Approved October 27, 1972.
jblio Law 92-594
To

AN ACT
section 7 of the Fishermen's Protective Act of 29<j7.

Be it enacted by tlie^S^nate and House of Representatives of tlie
United States of Arrierkaw^^tgress
assembled,* ' That
subsection (e)
^^*. /-.-. TT r>i m ~CK*-L
of section 7 of the Fishermen's
tive A c t Of 1 9 6 7 ( 2 2 U . S . C . 1 9 7 7
( e ) ) , is amended to read as follows:
Jective until J u l y 1,
"(e) T h e provisions of this section shall
1977.".
^
SEC. 2. Clause (1) of subsection (f) of section 7 of thel^ishermen's
Protective Act of 1967 (22 U.S.C. 1977(f) ( 1 ) ) , is amended toftwu! as
follows:
"(1) the term 'Secretary' means the Secretary of Commerce/'.
—Apfjiun'J Gh tuber S7, 107:3.
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October 2 7 . 1972
fS. 354S]

Fishermen s

'

Protective Act of
1967, amendments
82 Stat. 729.

T

•

E UI Lhb SUXUJ uf Idaliu.

ARTICLE XII

^Nothing in this Compact shall be construed to prevent the
United States, a signatory State or political subdivision
thereof, person, corporation, or association, from instituting or
maintaining any action or proceeding, legal or equitable, for
the protection of any right under State or Federal law or under
this Compact.
\

74

WATER AND IRRIGATION

73-16-3

ARTICLE XIII

NothinV contained in this Compact shall be deemed
1. T&> affect the obligations of the United States of
America to the Indian tribes;
2. IbXimpair, extend or otherwise affect any right or
power ofyhe United States, its agencies or instrumentalities involVed herein; nor the capacity of the United States
to hold orVcquire additional rights to the use of the water
of the BeaA River;
3. lb suraect any property or rights of the United
States to the\ laws of the States which were not subject
thereto prior V) the date of this Compact;
4. lb subject any property of the United States to
taxation by theVStates or any subdivision thereof, nor to
obligate the Uniwjd States to pay any State or subdivision
thereof for loss ofc taxes.

VRTICLE xrv
At intervals not exceeding twenty years, the Commission
shall review the provisions hereof, and after notice and public
hearing, may propose amendments to any such provision,
provided, however, that the\ provisions contained herein shall
remain in full force and effect until such proposed amendments have been ratified by Vhe legislatures of the signatory
States and consented to by Congress.
ARTICLE XV
This Compact may be terminated at any time by the
unanimous agreement of the signVtory States. In the event of
such termination all rights established under it shall continue
unimpaired.
\
ARTICLE XW
Should a court of competent jurisdiction hold any part of
this Compact to be contrary to the constitution of any signatory State or to the Constitution of the United States, all other
severable provisions of this Compact sftall continue in full
force and effect.
\
ARTICLE XVII

\

This Compact shall be in effect when itVhall have been
ratified by the Legislature of each signatoryyState and consented to by the Congress of the United Stares of America.
Notice of ratification by the legislatures of Yhe signatory
States shall be given by the Governor of each signatory State
to the Governor of each of the other signatory States and to the
President of the United States of America, and th\ President
is hereby requested to give notice to the GovernorW each of
the signatory States of approval by the Congress of the United
States of America.
\
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, The Commissioners and their
advisers have executed this Compact in five originalsXone of
which shall be deposited with the General Services Administration of the United States of America, one of which shall be
forwarded to the Governor of each of the signatory States,Void
one of which shall be made a part of the permanent record^ of
the Bear River Commission.
\
Done at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 22nd day of DecembeV,
1070. •' •
••,,•••„•>
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(» Clifford J. Skinner
(s\ J. Daniel Roberts

(s) Don W. Gilbert

For\the State of Utah:
(s) SL Paul Homgren
(s) S\neon Weston

(s) Daniel F. Lawrence

For thaState of Wyoming:
(s) Geonge L. Christopulos (s) John A. Tsichert
(s) J. W.^yers
Attest:
Approved:)
Daniel F. Lawrence
Wallace N. Vibson
Secretary of the Bear
Representative of the
United Statea of America River Commission
1975
73-16-3. Ratification of compact.
The compact ratified by this act is the original signed by the
commissioners representing the states of Idaho, Utah, and
Wyoming, and theUecretary of the commission, and approved
by the representative of the United States of America, and
deposited in the archives of the Department of State of the
United States of America and with the Division of Archives oi
the state of Utah.
\
19&
73-16-4. Members o\ commission.
There shall be three \pembers of the Bear River Compact
commission from the state of Utah. One member shall be the
interstate stream commissioner of Utah and he shall be
chairman of the Utah delegation. The other two commission
ers from Utah shall be appomted by the state water and powe]
board with the consent of tft£ governor, and they shall hole
office at the pleasure of the water and power board and unti
their successors shall have bee\ appointed and qualified. Eacl
member shall be a bona fide resident of the state of Utah an<
one shall be a landowner and thaupper division as defined b]
the compact. The Utah water anc\ power board may with th<
consent of the governor appoint tw\) alternate members of th<
Bear River commission. One such Alternate shall be a bom
fide resident of the state of Utan\ and a landowner an<
irrigator actually residing on and operating a farm within th<
lower division as defined by the compact and he shall tx
entitled to act at all regular and special meetings of the Bea
River commission whenever the regulanmember of the com
mission from this same area is unable iX serve and act. On<
such alternate shall be a bena fide residentof the state of Utal
and shall be a landowner and irrigator actually residing oi
and operating a farm within the upper division as defined b;
the compact and he shall be entitled to act a\ all regular an<
special meetings of the Bear River commissions whenever thi
regular member of the commission from thisXsame area i
unable to serve and act. Each member of the commission fron
Utah shall receive a per diem plus necessary wepenses, a
provided by law.
\
198
73-16-5. E r r o r in copying does not invalidate^
Any error made, if any, in copying the original compact i
Section 73-16-2 hereof, shall be held not to invalidate th
ratification of the compact in any way.
\ 195
CHAPTER 17
COLUMBIA RIVER COMPACT
(Superseded by Laws 1961, ch. 171, §§ 1 to 6.)
70 17 1fee70 17-4. Superseded.
CHAPTER 18
STATE BOATING ACT
Section
73-18-1.
73-18-2.

Statement of policy.
Definitions.

\
\
^
lOOi

75
Section
73-18-3.
73-18-3.5.
73-18-4.
73-18-5.
73-18-6.
73-18-7.

73-18-7.1.
73-18-7.2.
73-18-7.3.
73-18-7.4.
73-18-8.
73-18-8.1.
73-18-9.
73-18-10.
73-18-11.
73-18-12.
73-18-12.1.
73-18-12.2.

73-18-12.3.
73-18-12.4.
73-18-12.5.
73-18-12.6.

73-18-12.7.
73-18-12.8.
73-18-13.

73-18-14.
73-18-15.
73-18-15.1.
73-18-15.2.
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Section
Enforcement of State Boating Act to be supervised by division.
Advisory council.
Board may promulgate rules.
Repealed.
Numbering of motorboats and sailboats required — Exception.
Registration requirements — Exemptions —
Agents — Records — Period of registration
and renewal — Expiration — Notice of
transfer of interest or change of address —
Duplicate registration card — Invalid registration — Powers of board.
Fraudulent application for registration or certificate of title.
Falsified registration or certificate of title.
Suspension or revocation of a registration or
certificate of title.
Canceled, suspended, or revoked registration
or certificate of title to be returned.
Safety equipment required to be on board
vessels.
Capacity and certification label.
Exemptions from registration.
Owner of boat livery — Duties.
Regulation of muffling devices.
Operation in willful or wanton disregard for
safety deemed misdemeanor.
Operating under influence — Local ordinances
to be consistent with chapter.
Boating under the influence of alcohol or drugs
or with high blood or breath alcohol content
— Criminal punishment — Arrest without a
warrant.
Operating under the influence — Standards
for administration and interpretation of
chemical analysis.
Operating under the influence — Admissibility
of chemical test — Other evidence.
Operating under the influence — Prosecuting
violations of local ordinances.
Operating under the influence — Implied consent to chemical tests for alcohol or drugs —
Refusal to submit — Revocation of registration — Court action on revocation — Person
incapable of refusal — Results of test available — Who may give test — Evidence.
Operating under the influence — Seizure and
impoundment of vessel.
Operating under the influence — Removal or
impoundment of vehicle used to tow impounded vessel.
Duties of operator involved in accident — Notification and reporting procedures — Use of
accident reports — Giving false information
as misdemeanor.
Transmittal of information to official or agency
of United States.
Board to adopt rules concerning water skiing
and aquaplane riding and use of other devices towed behind a vessel.
Promulgation of vessel navigation and steering
rules.
Minimum age of operators without supervision
— Exception — Fee for safety course.
Regattas, races, exhibitions — Rules.
Scope of application of chapter — Identical

73-18-18.
73-18-19.
73-18-20

73-18-20.1.
73-18-20.2.
73-18-20.3.
73-18-20.4.
73-18-20.5.
73-18-20.6.
73-18-20.7.
73-18-21.
73-18-22.
73-18-23.

local ordinances authorized — Application
for special local rules.
Liability of owner for injury or damage occasioned by negligent operation of vessel by
minor.
Publication of rules and regulations.
Enforcement of chapter — Authority to stop
and board vessels — Disregarding law enforcement signal to stop as misdemeanor —
Procedure for arrest.
Seizure of a vessel.
Release and sale of a seized vessel.
Falsified hull identification, engine, or motor
number.
Duty to report falsified vessel or motor number.
Reporting of theft and recovery of vessels.
Report by owners or lienholders of thefts and
recoveries.
Unlawful control over vessels — Penalties —
Effect of prior consent —Accessory or accomplice.
Violation of chapter as class B misdemeanor.
Funds collected — Disposition.
Separability clause.

73-18-1. Statement of policy.
It is the policy of this state to regulate and promote safety
for persons and property in and connected with the use,
operation and equipment of vessels and to promote uniformity
of laws and to adopt and pursue an educational program in
relation thereto.
mi
73-18-2. Definitions.
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Board* means the Board of Parks and Recreation.
(2) "Boat livery" means an entity which holds any
vessel for renting, leasing, or chartering.
(3) "Carrying passengers for hire" means to transport
persons on vessels or to lead persons on vessels for
remuneration.
(4) "Dealer" means any person who is licensed by the
appropriate authority to engage in and who is engaged in
the business of buying and selling vessels or of manufacturing them for sale.
(5) "Division" means the Division of Parks and Recreation.
(6) "Motorboat" means any vessel propelled by machinery* whether or not the machinery is the principal source
of propulsion.
(7) "Operate" means to navigate, control, or otherwise
use a vessel.
(8) "Operator" means the person who is in control of a
vessel while it is in use.
(9) "Owner" means a person, other than a lien holder,
holding a proprietary interest in or the title to a vessel.
The term includes a person entitled to the use or possession of a vessel subject to an interest by another person,
reserved or created by agreement and securing payment
or performance of an obligation. The term does not include
a lessee under a lease not intended as security.
(10) "Personal watercraft" means a motorboat that is:
(a) less than 16 feet in length;
(b) propelled by a water jet pump; and
(c) designed to be operated by a person sitting,
standing, or kneeling on the vessel, rather than
sitting or standing inside the vessel.
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vll) "Sailboat*" means any vessel having one or more
sails and propelled by wind
(12) "Vessel" means every type of watercraft, other
than a seaplane on the water, used or capable of being
used as a means of transportation on water
(13) "Wakeless speed" m e a n s an operating speed a t
which the vessel does not create or make a wake or white
water trailing the vessel This speed is not m excess of five
miles per hour
Q4) "Waters of this state" means any waters within the
territorial limits of this state
1995

73-18-3. Enforcement of State Boating Act to be supervised by division.
The administration and enforcement of the State Boating
Act shall be under the supeT-vision and direction of the
division

1986

73-18-3.5. A d v i s o r y c o u n c i l .
The board may appoint an advisory council representing
various boating interests to seek recommendations on state
boating policies
1987

73-18-4. Board may promulgate rules.
The board may promulgate rules
(1) creating a uniform waterway marking system
which shall be obeyed by all vessel operators,
(2) regulating the placement of waterway markers and
other permanent or anchored objects on the waters of this
state,
(3) zoning certain waters of this state for the purpose of
prohibiting the operation of vessels or motors for safety
and health purposes only, and
(4) regulating vessel operators who carry passengers
for hire ana setting a fee not to exceed $10 for licensing
these operators
1987
73-18-5.

Repealed.

1969

73-18-6.

N u m b e r i n g of m o t o r b o a t s a n d s a i l b o a t s re-

quired — Exception.
(1) Every motorboat and sailboat on the waters of this state
shall be numbered No person shall operate or give permission
for the operation of any motorboat or sailboat on the waters of
this state unless the motorboat or sailboat is numbered m
accordance with
(a) this chapter,
(b) applicable federal law, or
(c) a federally-approved numbering system of another
state, if the owner is a resident of that state and his
motorboat or sailboat has not been in this state in excess
of 60 days for the calendar year
(2) The number assigned to a motorboat or sailboat in
accordance with this chapter, applicable federal law, or a
federally-approved numbering system of another state shall
be displayed on each side of the bow of the motorboat or
sailboat, except this requirement does not apply to any vessel
which has a valid marine document issued by the United
States Coast Guard
1987
73-18-7.

Registration requirements — Exemptions —
A g e n t s — R e c o r d s — P e r i o d of r e g i s t r a t i o n
a n d r e n e w a l — E x p i r a t i o n — N o t i c e of t r a n s fer of i n t e r e s t or c h a n g e of a d d r e s s — Duplic a t e r e g i s t r a t i o n c a r d — Invalid r e g i s t r a t i o n
— P o w e r s of b o a r d .
(1) (a) Each motorboat and sailboat on the waters of this
state shall be registered, unless it is exempt from registration a s provided for in Section 73-18-9
(b) A person may not place, or give permission for the
placement of, a motorboat or sailboat on any waters of
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this state or operate or give permission for the operation
of a motorboat or sailboat on the waters of this state,
unless the motorboat or sailboat is registered m accordance with this chapter or is exempt from registration as
provided for m Section 73-18-9

(2) (a) The owner of each motorboat or sailboat required to
be registered by this state shall file an application for
registration with the division on forms approved by the
division
(h) d) The application shall be signed by the owner of
the motorboat or sailboat and accompanied by a fee
set bv the board
(n) This fee may not exceed $10 per year
(c> The division, before issuing a registration card and
registration decals, shall require from each applicant a
certificate from the county assessor of the county in which
the motorboat or sailboat has situs for taxation containing
one of the following statements
d) the property tax on the motorboat or sailboat for
the current year has been paid,
(u) in the county assessor's opinion, the property
tax is a lien on real property sufficient to secure the
payment of the property tax; or
(in) the motorboat or sailboat is exempt by law
from payment of property tax for the current year
(3) (a) Upon receipt of the application m the approved
form, the division shall record the receipt and issue to the
applicant registration decals and a registration card
which state the number assigned to the motorboat or
sailboat and the name and address of the owner
(b) The registration card shall be available for inspection on the motorboat or sailboat for which it was issued,
whenever that motorboat or sailboat is in operation
(4) The assigned number shall
(a) be painted or permanently attached to each side of
the forward half of the motorboat or sailboat,
(b) consist of plain vertical block characters not less
than three inches m height,
(c) contrast with the color of the background and be
distinctly visible and legible,
(d) have spaces or hyphens equal to the width of a
letter between the letter and numeral groupings, and
(e) read from left to right
(5) Any vessel with a valid marine document issued by the
United States Coast Guard is exempt from the number display
requirements of Subsection (4)
(6) The nonresident owner of any motorboat or sailboat
already covered by a valid number, which has been assigned to
it pursuant to federal law or a federally-approved numbering
system of his resident state, shall be exempt from registration
while operating the motorboat or sailboat on the waters of this
state unless he is opera ting m excess of the reciprocity period
provided for in Subsection 73-18-9(1)
(7) (a) If the ownership of a motorboat or sailboat changes,
a new application form with the fee shall be filed with the
division and a new registration card and registration
decals shall be issued in the same manner as provided for
in Subsections (2) and (3)
(b) The current number assigned to the vessel shall be
reassigned to the new owner to display on the motorboat
or sailboat
(8) If the United States Coast Guard has m force an overall
system of identification numbering for motorboats or sailboats
within the United States, the numbering system employed
under this chapter by the board shall be m conformity with
that system
(9) The division may authorize any person to act as its
agent for the registration of motorboats and sailboats Any
number assigned and any registration card and registration
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decals issued by a n agent of the division in conformity with
this chapter and rules of the board shall be valid.
(10) (a) All records of the division made or kept pursuant to
this section shall be classified by the Motor Vehicle
Division in the same m a n n e r as motor vehicle records are
classified under Section 41-la-116.
(b) Division records a r e available for inspection in the
same m a n n e r as motor vehicle records pursuant to Section 41-la-116.
(11) Each registration, registration card, and decal issued
under this chapter shall continue in effect for a period set by
the board. A registration may be renewed by the owner in the
same manner provided for in the initial application. The
current number assigned to t h e vessel shall be reassigned
when the registration is renewed.
(12) The board shall fix a day a n d month of the year on
which registrations, registration cards, and registration decals expire.
(13) (a) The owner shall notify t h e division of the transfer
of all or any p a r t of his interest, other than creation of a
security interest, in a motorboat or sailboai registered in
this state under Subsections (2) and (3) or of the destruction or abandonment of the motorboat or sailboat.
(b) This notification m u s t take place within 15 days of
the transfer, destruction, or abandonment.
(c) The transfer, destruction, or abandonment of a
motorboat or sailboat terminates its registration except if
a transfer of a part interest which does not affect the
owner's right to operate a motorboat or sailboat, the
transfer shall not terminate the registration.
(14) (a) T h e registered owner shall notify the division
within 15 days if his address changes from the address
appearing on the registration card and shall, as a part of
this notification, furnish t h e division with his new address.
(b) The board may provide in its rules for the surrender
of the registration card bearing the former address and its
replacement with a new registration card bearing the new
address, or for the alteration of an outstanding registration card to show the new address of the holder.
(15) (a) If the registration card is lost or stolen, a fee of $4
may be collected by the division for the issuance of a
duplicate.
(b) If the registration decals a r e lost or stolen, a fee of
$3 may be collected by the division for the issuance of
duplicate decals.
(16) A number other than the number assigned to a motorboat or sailboat or a number for a motorboat or sailboat
granted reciprocity under this chapter may not be painted,
attached, or otherwise displayed on either side of the bow of a
motorboat or sailboat.
(17) A motorboat or sailboat registration and number shall
be invalid if obtained by knowingly falsifying an application
for registration.
(18) The board may:
(a) designate the suffix to assigned numbers;
(b) adopt rules for t h e display of registration decals;
(c) adopt rules for the issuance and display of dealer
numbers and registrations; and
(d) adopt rules for t h e issuance and display of temporary registrations.
1993
73-18-7.1. Fraudulent application for registration or
certificate of title.
A person is guilty of a third degree felony if he:
(1) fraudulently uses a false or fictitious name in any
application for a registration or certificate of title for a
motorboat, sailboat, or outboard motor; or
(2) in making an application specified in Subsection (1),
he:
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(a) knowingly makes a false statement;
(b) knowingly conceals a material fact; or
(c) otherwise commits a fraud.

1990

73-18-7.2. Falsified registration or certificate of title.
It is a third degree felony for any person to:
(1) alter with fraudulent intent any motorboat or sailboat certificate of title, registration card, or registration
decal or outboard motor certificate of title issued by the
division or its authorized agent;
(2) forge or counterfeit any motorboat or sailboat certificate of title, registration card, or registration decal or
outboard motor certificate of title purporting to have been
issued by the division or its authorized agent;
(3) alter, falsify, or forge any assignment upon a motorboat, sailboat, or outboard motor certificate of title; or
(4) hold or use any motorboat or sailboat certificate of
title, registration card, or registration decal or outboard
motor certificate of title knowing it has been altered,
forged, or falsified.
1990
73-18-7.3. Suspension or revocation of a registration
or certificate of title.
The division or its authorized agent may suspend or revoke
the registration or certificate of title of a motorboat, sailboat,
or outboard motor if:
(1) the division or its authorized agent determines that
the registration or certificate of title was fraudulently or
erroneously issued;
(2) the division or its authorized agent determines that
a registered motorboat or sailboat is mechanically unfit or
unseaworthy for operation on the waters of this state;
(3) a registered motorboat or sailboat has been dismantled or wrecked so that it loses its character as a
vessel;
(4) the division or its authorized agent determines that
the required registration or titling fee h a s not been paid
or is not paid upon reasonable notice and demand;
(5) a registration decal or number is knowingly displayed upon a motorboat or sailboat other than the one for
which t h e decal or number was issued;
(6) the division or its authorized agent determines that
the owner h a s committed any offense under this chapter
or Title 41, Chapter l a , P a r t 5, involving the registration
or certificate of title of a motorboat, sailboat, or outboard
motor; or
(7) t h e division or authorized agent is so authorized
under any other provision of law.
1992
73-18-7.4. Canceled, suspended, or revoked registration or certificate of title to be returned.
If the division or its authorized agent cancels, suspends, or
revokes the registration or certificate of title of a motorboat,
sailboat, or outboard motor, the owner shall immediately
return the canceled, suspended, or revoked registration card,
registration decal, or certificate of title to the division or
authorized agent.
1990
73-18-8. Safety equipment required to be on board
vessels.
(1) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (l)(c), each vessel
shall have, for each person on board, one personal flotation device which is approved for the type of use by the
commandant of the United States Coast Guard,
(b) Each personal flotation device shall be:
(i) in serviceable condition;
(ii) legally marked with the United States Coast
Guard approval number; and
(iii) of an appropriate size for the person for whom
it is intended.
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(c) (i) Sailboards are exempt from the provisions of
Subsection (l)(a).
(ii) The board may exempt certain types of vessels
from the provisions of Subsection (l)(a) under certain
conditions or upon certain waters.
(d) The board may require by rule for personal flotation
devices to be worn:
(i) while a person is on board a certain type of
vessel;
(ii) by a person under a certain age; or
(iii) on certain waters of the state.
(e) For vessels 16 feet cr more in length, there shall
also be on board, one Type IV throwable personal flotation
device which is approved for this use by the commandant
of the United States Coast Guard.
(2) Each vessel shall display navigation lights when the
vessel is on the waters of this state between sunset and
sunrise.
(3) If a vessel is not entirely open and it carries or uses any
flammable or toxic fluid in any enclosure for any purpose, the
vessel must be equipped with an efficient natural or mechanical ventilation system which is capable of removing resulting
gases prior to and during the time the vessel is occupied by
any person.
(4) Each vessel shall have fire extinguishing equipment on
board.
(5) Any inboard gasoline engine shall be equipped with a
carburetor backfire flame control device.
(6) The board may:
(a) require additional safety equipment by rule; and
(b) adopt rules conforming with the requirements of
this section which govern specifications for and the use of
safety equipment.
(7) A person may not operate or give permission for the
operation of a vessel which is not equipped as required by this
section or rules promulgated under this section.
1995

73-18-8.1. Capacity and certification label.
(1) Each vessel manufactured after November 1, 1972,
which is less than 20 feet in length, except a sailboat, canoe,
kayak, inflatable vessel, or homemade motor boat must have a
United States Coast Guard capacity and certification label
permanently affixed to the vessel and clearly visible to the
operator when boarding or operating the vessel. The capacity
and certification information may be combined together and
displayed on one label.
(2) No person shall operate, or give permission for the
operation of, any vessel on the waters of this state if it is
loaded or powered in excess of the maximum capacity information on the United States Coast Guard capacity label.
(3) No person shall alter, deface, or remove any United
States Coast Guard capacity or certification information label
affixed to a vessel.
(4) No person shall operate, or give permission for the
operation of, a vessel on the waters of this state if the required
United States Coast Guard capacity or certification information label h a s been altered, defaced, or removed.
1990

73-18-9. Exemptions from registration.
Registration under this chapter is not required for any of the
following:
(1) a motorboat or sailboat already covered by a valid
registration issued by its nonresident owner's resident
state and it has not been within this state in excess of 14
days for the calendar year;
(2) a motorboat or sailboat from a country other than
the United States temporarily using the waters of this
state;
(3) a motorboat or sailboat whose owner is the United
States, a state or subdivision thereof;
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(4) a ship's lifeboat; or
(5) a motorboat or sailboat belonging to a class of
vessels which is exempted from registration by the board
after the board finds:
(a) that the registration of motorboats or sailboats
of this class will not materially aid in their identification; and
(b) that the United States Coast Guard has a
numbering system applicable to the class of motorboats or sailboats to which the motorboat or sailboat
in question belongs, and the motorboat or sailboat
would also be exempt from numbering if it were
subject to federal law.
1987
73-18-10. Owner of boat livery — Duties.
(1) The owner of a boat livery shall keep a record of the
following: the name and address of the person hiring any
vessel; the identification number of the vessel; the vessel's
departure date and time; and the vessel's expected time of
return. The record shall be preserved for at least one year.
(2) Neither the owner of a boat livery nor his agent or
employee may permit any vessel to depart from the premises
of the boat livery unless the owner has equipped it as required
under this chapter and unless he has advised the lessee or
renter of the vessel of all rules promulgated under this chapter
which the lessee or renter must obey.
1986
73-18-11. Regulation of muffling devices.
The board shall adopt rules for the regulating of muffling
devices on all vessels.
1986
73-18-12. Operation in willful or wanton disregard for
safety deemed misdemeanor.
No person m a y operate any vessel, or manipulate any water
skis, aquaplane, or similar device in a willful or wanton
disregard for t h e safety of persons or property. A violation of
this section is a class B misdemeanor.
1987

73-18-12.1. Operating under influence — Local ordinances to be consistent with chapter.
Any ordinance adopted by a local authority that governs a
person's operation of a vessel while having alcohol in the blood
or breath, or while under the influence of alcohol or drugs,
shall be consistent with the provisions of this chapter.
1987
73-18-12.2. Boating under the influence of alcohol or
drugs or with high blood or breath alcohol
content — Criminal punishment — Arrest
without a warrant.
(1) (a) It is unlawful and punishable as provided in this
section for any person to operate a vessel on the waters of
this state if:
(i) the person has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater, as shown by any
chemical test given within two hours after the alleged
operation; or
(ii) the person is under the influence of alcohol or
any drug or the combined influence of alcohol and any
drug to a degree which renders the person incapable
of safely operating a vessel.
(b) The fact that a person charged with violating this
section is or has been legally entitled to use alcohol or a
drug is not a defense against any charge of violating this
section.
(2) Alcohol concentration in the blood shall be based upon
grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood, and alcohol
concentration in the breath shall be based upon grams of
alcohol per 210 liters of breath.
(3) For the purposes of this section, the standard of negligence is that of simple negligence, the failure to exercise that
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degree of care which an ordinarily reasonable and prudent
person exercises under like or similar circumstances.
(4) (a) Every person who is convicted of a violation of
Subsection (1) is guilty of a class B misdemeanor, however, if the person has inflicted a bodily injury upon
another as a proximate result of having operated the
vessel in a negligent manner, he is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor.
(b) No portion of any sentence imposed under Subsection (a) may be suspended.
(5) In addition to the penalties provided for in Subsection
(4), the court shall, upon a first conviction of a violation of this
section:
(a) impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 48
consecutive hours nor more than 240 hours, with emphasis on serving in the drunk tank of the jail, or require the
person to work in a community-service work program for
not less than 24 nor more than 50 hours; and
(b) order the person to participate in an assessment
and educational series at a licensed alcohol rehabilitation
facility.
(6) Upon a second conviction within five years after a first
conviction under this section or under a local ordinance
similar to this section adopted in compliance with Section
73-18-12.1, the court shall, in addition to the penalties provided for in Subsection (4):
(a) impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than
240 consecutive hours nor more than 720 hours, with
emphasis on serving in the drunk tank of the jail, or
require the person to work in a community-service work
program for not less than 80 nor more than 240 hours;
and
(b) order the person to participate in an assessment
and educational series at a licensed alcohol rehabilitation
facility. The court may, in its discretion, order the person
to obtain treatment at an alcohol rehabilitation facility.
(7) Upon a subsequent conviction within five years after a
second conviction under this section or under a local ordinance
similar to this section adopted in compliance with Section
73-18-12.1, the court shall, in addition to the penalties provided for in Subsection (4):
(a) impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than
720 consecutive hours nor more than 2,160 hours with
emphasis on serving in the drunk tank of the jail, or
require the person to work in a community-service work
program for not less than 240 nor more than 720 hours;
and
(b) order the person to obtain treatment at an alcohol
rehabilitation facility.
(8) A person convicted of a violation of this section is not
eligible for parole or probation until any sentence imposed
under this section has been served. Probation or parole
resulting from a conviction for a violation of this section or a
local ordinance similar to this section adopted in compliance
with Section 73-18-12.1 may not be terminated until all fines
and fees, including fees for restitution and rehabilitation
costs, assessed against the convicted person, have been paid.
(9) (a) The provisions in Subsections (5), (6), and (7) requiring a sentencing court to order a convicted person to
participate in an assessment and educational series at a
licensed alcohol rehabilitation facility or to obtain treatment at an alcohol rehabilitation facility apply to a
conviction for a violation of Section 73-18-12 that qualifies
as a prior offense under Subsection (10). A court shall
render the same order regarding education or treatment
at an alcohol rehabilitation facility for a first, second, or
subsequent conviction under Section 73-18-12 that qualifies as a prior offense under Subsection (10), as the court
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would render for a first, second, or subsequent conviction
of a violation of Subsection (1).
(b) For purposes of determining whether a conviction
under Section 73-18-12 which qualified as a prior conviction under Subsection (10) is a first, second, or subsequent
conviction under this subsection, a previous conviction
under either Section 73-18-12 or 73-18-12.2 is considered
a prior conviction. Any alcohol rehabilitation program and
any community-based or other education program provided for in this section shall be approved by the Department of Human Services.'
(10) (a) When the prosecution agrees to a plea of guilty or
no contest to a charge of a violation of Section 73-18-12 or
of a local ordinance similar to that section adopted in
compliance with Section 73-18-12.1 the prosecution shall
state for the record a factual basis for the plea, including
whether there had been consumption of alcohol or drugs
by the defendant in connection with the offense. The
statement shall be an offer of proof of the facts which
shows whether there was consumption of alcohol or drugs
in connection with the offense.
(b) The court shall advise the defendant before accepting the plea offered under this subsection of the consequences of a violation of Section 73-18-12 as follows. If the
court accepts the defendants plea of guilty or no contest to
a charge of violating Section 73-18-12, and the prosecutor
states for the record that there was consumption of
alcohol or drugs by the defendant in connection with the
offense, the resulting conviction is a prior offense for the
purposes of Subsection (9).
(11) A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person
for a violation of this section when the peace officer has
probable cause to believe the violation has occurred, although
not in his presence, and if the peace officer has probable cause
to believe that the violation was committed by the person.
1990

73-18-12.3. Operating under the influence — Standards for administration and interpretation
of chemical analysis.
(1) The commissioner of public safety shall establish standards for the administration and interpretation of chemical
analysis of a person's breath including standards of training.
(2) In any action or proceeding in which it is material to
prove that a person was operating a vessel while under the
influence of alcohol or with a blood or breath alcohol content
statutorily prohibited, documents offered as memoranda or
records of acts, conditions, or events to prove that the analysis
was conducted in conformance with standards established
under Subsection (1) are admissible if:
(a) the judge finds that they were made in the regular
course of the investigation at or about the time of the act,
condition, or event; and
(b) the source of information from which made and the
method and circumstances of their preparation indicate
their trustworthiness.
(3) If the judge finds that the standards established under
Subsection (1) and the conditions of Subsection (2) have been
met, there is a presumption that the test results are valid and
further foundation for introduction of the evidence is unnecessary.
1987
73-18-12.4. Operating under the influence — Admissibility of chemical test — Other evidence.
(1) In any action or proceeding in which it is material to
prove that a person was operating a vessel while under the
influence of alcohol or with a blood or breath alcohol content
statutorily prohibited, the results of any chemical test as
authorized in Section 73-18-12.6 are admissible as evidence.
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(2) If the chemical test was taken more than two hours after
the alleged operation, the test resuk is admissible as evidence
of the person's blood or breath alcohol level at the time of the
alleged operation, but the trier of fact shall determine what
weight shall be given to the test results.
(3) The provisions of this section do not prevent a court
from receiving any other admissible evidence as to a defendant's blood or breath alcohol level a t t h e time of the alleged
operation.
1987
73-18-12.5. Operating under the influence — Prosecuting violations of local ordinances.
Attorneys of cities and towns may prosecute alleged violations of a local ordinance adopted in compliance with Section
73-13-12.1.
"
1987
73-18-12.6. Operating under the influence — Implied
consent to chemical teste for alcohol or drugs
— Refusal to submit — Revocation of registration — Court action on revocation — Person
incapable of refusal — Results of test available — Who may give test — Evidence.
(1) (a) A person operating a vessel on the waters of this
state is considered to have given his consent to any
chemical test of his breath, blood, or urine for the purpose
of determining whether he was operating a vessel while
having a blood or breath alcohol content which is statutorily prohibited, or while under the influence of alcohol,
any drug, or combination of alcohol and any drug, so long
as the test is administered at the direction of a peace
officer having grounds to believe that person to have been
operating a vessel while having a blood or breath alcohol
content which is statutorily prohibited, or while under the
influence of alcohol any drug, or combination of alcohol
and any drug. A peace officer shall determine which test
shall be administered.
(b) A person who has been requested under this section
to submit to any chemical test of his breath, blood, or
urine, does not have the right to select the test to be
administered. The failure or inability of a peace officer to
arrange for any specific test is not a defense with regard
to taking a test requested by the peace officer, and it is not
a defense in any criminal, civil, or administrative proceeding resulting from a person's refusal to submit to the
requested test
(2) If the person has been placed under arrest and has then
been requested by a peace officer to submit to any one or more
of the chemical tests provided in Subsection (1) and refuses to
submit to any chemical test, the person shall be warned by the
peace officer requesting the test that a refusal to submit to the
test is admissible in civil or criminal proceedings as provided
under Subsection (10)(b). Following this warning, unless the
person immediately requests the chemical test as offered by a
peace officer be administered, no test shall be given and the
peace officer shall submit a sworn report, within five days
after the date of the arrest, that he had grounds to believe the
arrested person had been operating a vessel while having a
blood or breath alcohol content which is statutorily prohibited,
or while under the influence of alcohol or any drug, or
combination of alcohol and any drug and that the person had
refused to submit to any chemical test as set forth in Subsection (1).
(3) Within 20 days after receiving a sworn report from a
peace officer to the effect that the person has refused any
chemical test, the division shall notify the person of the date
and time of his hearing before the division. If at that hearing
the division determines that the person was granted the right
to submit to a chemical test and refused to submit to any test,
or if the person fails t-o appear before the division as required
in the notice, the division shall revoke the registration of any
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vessel registered in the person's name or any vessel registered
jointly in his name and another person's name. Any registration revoked may not be renewed for a period of one year
following the date of revocation. The division shall also assess
against the person a fee of $25 to cover administrative costs.
The fee must be paid before any vessel registration is renewed.
(4) Any person whose registration has been revoked by the
division under the provisions of this section shall have the
right to file a petition within 30 days after the revocation for a
hearing in the district court for the county in which the person
resides. The court is hereby vested with jurisdiction, and it
shall set the trial de novo upon ten days' written notice to the
division and thereupon take testimony and examine the facts
of the case and determine whether the petitioner's registration is subject to revocation under the provisions of this
chapter. If the person obtains an unappealed court decision
that the revocation was not proper, the fee provided in
Subsection (3) shall be cancelled.
(5) Any person who is unconscious, or in any other condition rendering him incapable of refusing to submit to any
chemical test is considered not to have withdrawn the consent
provided for in Subsection (1), and any test may be administered whether or not the person has been arrested.
(6) Upon the request of the person who was tested, the
results of his test shall be made available to him.
(7) Only a physician, registered nurse, practical nurse, or
person authorized under Section 26-1-30, acting at the request
of a peace officer, may withdraw blood for the purpose of
determining alcoholic or drug content. This limitation does not
apply to the taking of a urine or breath specimen. Any
physician, registered nurse, practical nurse, or person authorized under Section 26-1-30 who, at the direction of a peace
officer, draws a sample of blood from any person whom the
peace officer has reason to believe is operating a vessel in
violation of this chapter, or hospital or medical facility at
which the sample is drawn, is immune from any civil or
criminal liability arising from it, if the test is administered
according to standard medical practice.
(8) The person to be tested may, at his own expense, have a
physician of his own choosing administer any chemical test in
addition to any test administered at the direction of the peace
officer. The failure or inability to obtain the additional test
does not affect admissibility of the results of any test taken at
the direction of a peace officer, nor should it preclude or delay
any test to be taken at the direction of a peace officer. Any
additional test shall be administered subsequent to any test
administered at the direction of the peace officer.
(9) For the purpose of determining whether to submit to
any chemical test, the person to be tested does not have the
right to consult an attorney nor is the person permitted to
have an attorney, physician, or other person present as a
condition for the taking of any test.
(10) (a) If a person under arrest has been requested by a
peace officer to submit to a breath test only, and the
person does take the breath test, the peace officer may
request additional tests of the person's blood and urine for
the purposes of detecting the presence of drugs or alcohol.
(b) If a person under arrest refuses to submit to any
chemical test under this section, evidence of refusal is
admissible in any civil or criminal action or proceeding
arising out of acts alleged to have been committed while
the person was operating a vessel while under the influence of alcohol or any drug or combination of alcohol and
any drug.
1996
73-18-12.7. Operating under the influence — Seizure
and impoundment of vessel.
(1) If a peace officer arrests or cites the operator of a vessel
for violating Section 73-18-12.2 or a local ordinance similar to
Section 73-18-12.2, which complies with Section 73-18-12.1,
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the peace officer shall seize and impound the vessel. If necessary for transportation of the vessel for impoundment, the
vessel's trailer may be used to transport the vessel.
(2) If a registered owner of the vessel, other than the driver,
is present at the time of arrest, the peace officer may release
the vessel to that registered owner, but only if:
(a) the registered owner*
(i) requests removal of the vessel from the scene:
(ii) presents to the peace officer sufficient identification to prove ownership of the vessel; and
(iii) would not, in the judgment of the peace officer,
be in violation of Section 73-18-12.2 or a local ordinance adopted in compliance with Section 73-18-12.1.
if permitted to operate the vessel; and
(b) the vessel is legally operable.
(3) (a) Any peace officer who impounds a vessel under this
section shall remove, or cause the vessel to be removed, to
the nearest accessible docking area, public or private
garage, state impound lot, or other approved storage
facility t h a t meets the standards set by rule by the Motor
Vehicle Division of the State Tax Commission, or if there
is none, another reasonably safe place. The standards set
by the Motor Vehicle Division shall be fair and reasonable
and shall be unrestrictive as to the number of docking or
other impoundment areas per geographical area.
(b) The peace officer or agency by whom the peace
officer is employed shall within 24 hours after the seizure
notify the Motor Vehicle Division of the seizure and
impoundment. The notice shall set forth:
(i) the operator's name;
(ii) a description of the vessel, its identification
number, if any, and its assigned number;
(iii) the date, time, and place of impoundment:
(iv) the reason for impoundment; and
(v) the location of the dock or other place where the
vessel is stored.
(4) Upon receipt of the notice, the Motor Vehicle Division
ball give notice to the registered owner of the vessel in the
ime manner as prescribed for vehicles by Section 41-la-114.
he notice shall:
(a) set forth:
(i) the date, time, and place of impoundment;
(ii) the name of the person operating the vessel at
the time of seizure;
(iii) the reason for seizure and impoundment; and
(iv) the location where the vessel is stored;
(b) inform the registered owner t h a t he is responsible
for payment of transportation charges, impound fees, and
storage fees charged against the vessel; and
(c) inform the registered owner of the vessel of the
conditions prescribed in Subsection (5) which must be
satisfied before the vessel may be released.
(5) (a) The impounded vessel shall be released after the
registered owner or the owner's agent:
(i) makes a claim for release of the vessel at an>
state office designated by the Motor Vehicle Division;
(ii) pays an impound fee of $25;
(iii) presents identification sufficient to prove ownership of the impounded vessel; and
(iv) pays all transportation, impound, and storage
fees.
(b) The transportation and storage fees shall be paid to
the docking area or other storage facility where the vessel
is stored. All impound fees assessed under this subsection
are dedicated revenue to the Motor Vehicle Division.
(6) (a) Any impounded vessel not claimed by the registered
owner or the owner's agent within 30 days shall be sold in
accordance with the procedures specified in Section 41la-1103 for the sale of impounded motor vehicles.
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(bj The proceeds, if any, shall be disposed of in the
manner specified in Section 41-la-1104.
(c) The date of impoundment is considered the date of
seizure for purposes of computing the time period.
(7) (a) Transportation and storage fees shall be established
by the Motor Vehicle Division and shall be reviewed by
the Motor Vehicle Division annually to ensure equity for
vessel owners and transportation and storage operators.
(b) Transportation, impound fees, or storage fees are a
lien on the vessel.
(8) The registered owner of the vessel, upon the payment of
all fees and charges incurred in the seizure and impoundment
of the owner's vessel, has a cause of action for all the fees and
charges, together with damages, court costs, and attorney
fees, against the operator of the vessel whose actions caused
the impoundment.
(9) Liability may not be imposed upon any peace officer, the
state, or any of its political subdivisions on account of the
enforcement of this section.
1992
73-18-12.8. O p e r a t i n g u n d e r t h e i n f l u e n c e — Removal
o r i m p o u n d m e n t of v e h i c l e u s e d to t o w imp o u n d e d vessel.
A vehicle used to tow a vessel which is impounded under
this chapter may be removed under the provisions of Subsection 41-6-44.30(2), but if no person is able to move the vehicle
under that section, the vehicle may be impounded if leaving it
unattended is contrary to the safety of the public.
1987
73-18-13.

D u t i e s of o p e r a t o r i n v o l v e d in a c c i d e n t —
Notification a n d r e p o r t i n g p r o c e d u r e s — U s e
of a c c i d e n t r e p o r t s — Giving false information a s m i s d e m e a n o r .
(1) It is the duty of the operator of a vessel involved in an
accident, if he can do so without seriously endangering his
own vessel, crew, or passengers, to render aid to those affected
by the accident as may be practicable. The operator shall also
give his name, address, and identification of his vessel in
writing to any person injured or to the owner of any property
damaged in the accident.
(2) The board shall adopt rules governing the notification
and reporting procedure for vessels involved in accidents.
Such rules shall be consistent with federal requirements.
(3) All accident reports shall be for the confidential use of
the division or other state agencies having use for the records
for accident prevention purposes, except t h a t the division may
disclose the identity of a person involved in an accident when
the person's identity is not otherwise known or when the
person denies his presence a t the accident. No report shall be
used as evidence in any trial, civil or criminal, arising out of an
accident, except that the division shall furnish upon demand
of any person who has, or claims to have, made the report or,
upon demand of any court, a certificate showing that a
specified accident report has or has not been made to the
division solely to prove a compliance or a failure to comply
with the requirement t h a t a report be made to the division.
Reports may be used as evidence when necessary to prosecute
charges filed in connection with a violation of Subsection (4).
(4) Any person who gives false information, knowingly or
having reason to believe it is false, in an oral or written report
as required in this chapter, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
1987

73-18-14.

T r a n s m i t t a l of information to official or
a g e n c y of U n i t e d S t a t e s .
In accordance with any request duly made by an authorized
official or agency of the United States, any information compiled or otherwise available to the division under Subsection
73-18-13(2) shall be transmitted to the official or agency of the
United States.
1986
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73-18-15. Board to adopt rules concerning water skiing and aquaplane riding and use of other
devices towed behind a vessel.
The board shall adopt rules for the regulation and safety of
water skiing and aquaplane riding, and the use of other
devices which are towed behind a vessel.
1986

73-18-15.1. Promulgation of vessel navigation and
steering rules.
The board may promulgate vessel navigation and steering
rules for the waters of the state.
1987

73-18-15.2. Minimum age of operators without supervision — Exception — Fee for safety course.
(1) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (2), a person under
16 years of age may operate a motorboat on the waters of
this state, if he is accompanied by a person who is at least
18 years of age.
(b) A person under 16 years of age may operate a
sailboat, if he is under the direct supervision of a person
who is at least 18 years of age.
(2) A person under 16 years of age and 12 years of age or
older may operate a personal watercrafl provided he:
(a) is under the direct supervision of a person who is at
least 18 years of age;
(b) completes a boating safety course approved by the
division; and
(c) has in his possession a boating safety certificate
issued by the boating safety course provider.
(3) A person under 18 years of age and 16 years of age or
older may operate a personal watercrafl, if he:
(a) completes a boating safety course approved by the
division; and
(b) has in his possession a boating safety certificate
issued by the boating safety course provider.
(4) A person under Subsection (3)(a) need not be accompanied by a parent, guardian, or responsible party while completing a boating safety course.
(5) As used in this section, "direct supervision" means
oversight at a distance within which visual contact is maintained.
(6) (a) The division may collect a fee not to exceed $12 from
each person who takes the division's boating safety course
to help defray the cost of the boating safety course.
(b) Money collected from the fee collected under Subsection (a) shall be deposited in the Boating Account.
73-18-16. Regattas, races, exhibitions — Rules.
The division may authorize the holding of regattas, motorboat or other boat races, marine parades, tournaments, or
exhibitions on any waters of this state. The board may adopt
rules concerning the safety of vessels and persons, either as
observers or participants.
1987

73-18-17. Scope of application of chapter — Identical
local ordinances authorized — Application
for special local rules.
(1) This chapter, and other applicable laws of this state
govern the operation, equipment, and numbering of vessels
whenever any vessel is operated on the waters of this state, or
when any activity regulated by this chapter takes place on the
waters of this state. Nothing in this chapter prevents the
adoption of any ordinance or local law relating to operation
and equipment of vessels, the provisions of which are identical
to the provisions of this chapter, amendments to this chapter,
and rules promulgated under this chapter. Ordinances or local
laws shall be operative only so long as and to the extent that
they continue to be identical to provisions of this chapter,
amendments to this chapter, and rules promulgated under
this chapter.
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(2) Any political subdivision of this state may, at any time,
but only after public notice, formally apply to the board for
special rules concerning the operation of vessels on any waters
within its territorial limits. The political subdivision shall set
forth in the application the reasons wThich make special rules
necessary or appropriate.
1987
73-18-18. Liability of owner for injury or damage occasioned by negligent operation of vessel by
minor.
The owner of a vessel shall be liable for any injury or
damage occasioned by t h e negligent operation of such vessel,
by a minor under the age of 18 years operating such vessel
with the express or implied consent of t h e owner, whether
under the laws of this s t a t e or by neglecting to observe such
ordinary care and such operation as the rules of common law
require.
1961

73-18-19. Publication of rules and regulations.
The rules promulgated under this chapter shall be published as required by Title 63, Chapter 46a, the Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act.
1987
73-18-20. Enforcement of chapter — Authority to stop
and board vessels — Disregarding law enforcement signal to stop as misdemeanor —•
Procedure for arrest.
(1) Any law enforcement officer authorized under Title 77,
Chapter la, may enforce the provisions of this chapter and the
rules promulgated under this chapter.
(2) Any law enforcement officer authorized under Title 77,
Chapter la, has the authority to stop and board any vessel
subject to this chapter, whether the vessel is on water or land.
If that officer determines the vessel is overloaded, unseaworthy, or the safety equipment required by this chapter or rules
of the board is not on the vessel, that officer may prohibit the
launching of the vessel or stop the vessel from operating.
(3) An operator who, having received a visual or audible
signal from a law enforcement officer authorized under Title
77, Chapter la, to bring his vessel to a stop, operates his vessel
in willful or wanton disregard of the signal so as to interfere
with or endanger the operation of any vessel or endanger any
person, or who attempts to flee or elude the officer whether by
vessel or otherwise is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
(4) Whenever any person is arrested for any violation of the
provisions of this chapter or of the rules promulgated under
this chapter, the procedure for arrest is the same as outlined
in Sections 41-6-166 through 41-6-169.
1987
73-18-20.1. Seizure of a vessel.
(1) A peace officer, without a warrant, may seize and take
possession of a vessel:
(a) that is placed or being operated on the waters of
this state with improper registration;
(b) that the peace officer has reason to believe has been
stolen;
(c) on which any hull identification number or serial
number for an engine or outboard motor has been defaced,
altered, or obliterated;
(d) that has been abandoned on public land, highways,
or waters of this state; or
(e) if the registration or title fees for the vessel or
outboard motor have not been paid.
(2) If necessary for the transportation of a seized vessel, the
vessel's trailer may be seized to transport and store the vessel.
(3) Any peace officer seizing or taking possession of a vessel
under this section shall immediately notify the Motor Vehicle
Division of the State Tax Commission of the action and shall
impound the vessel at a docking area, public or private garage,
state impound lot, or other storage facility approved by the
Motor Vehicle Division.
1990
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73-18-20.2. Release and s a l e of a s e i z e d v e s s e l .
(1) A vessel seized under Section 73-18-20.1 shall remain
impounded until:
(a) the vessel's registration has been properly completed and the appropriate fees have been paid; or
(b) the ownership of the vessel is established to the
satisfaction of the division or its authorized agent.
(2) If the hull identification number or serial number for
the engine or outboard motor h a s been defaced, altered, or
obliterated, the vessel may not be released until:
(a) the original manufacturer's hull identification number or engine or outboard motor serial number h a s been
replaced; or
(b) a new number assigned by the division or its
authorized agent has been provided and has been affixed
to the vessel, engine, or outboard motor.
(3) (a) Any seized vessel not claimed by the registered
owner or the owner's agent within 30 days shall be sold
and handled in accordance with the procedures specified
in Sections 41-la-1103 through 41-la-1106 for the sale of
impounded motor vehicles.
(b) The proceeds, if any, shall be disposed of in the same
manner as under Section 41-la-1104.
(c) Transportation, impound fees, or storage fees are a
lien on the vessel.
1992
73-18-20.3. Falsified hull identification, e n g i n e , o r motor number.
(1) A person is guilty of a third degree felony if he:
(a) with fraudulent intent defaces, destroys, or alters a
vessel hull identification number or serial number for an
engine or outboard motor;
(b) places or stamps any vessel hull identification number upon a vessel or serial number upon an engine or
outboard motor, except one assigned by the division or its
authorized agent;
(c) knowingly buys, receives, disposes of, sells, offers
for sale, or has in his possession any vessel, or engine or
outboard motor removed from a vessel, from which the
vessel hull identification number or engine or outboard
motor serial number, h a s been removed, defaced, covered,
altered, or destroyed for the purpose of concealing or
misrepresenting the identity of the vessel, engine, or
outboard motor;
(d) with intent to procure or pass title to a vessel or
outboard motor, receives or transfers possession of a
vessel or outboard motor which he knows or has reason to
believe has been stolen or unlawfully taken; or
(e) has in his possession a vessel or outboard motor
which he knows or has reason to believe has been stolen
or unlawfully taken, unless the person is a peace officer
engaged a t the time in the performance of his duty.
(2) (a) This section does not prohibit the restoration by an
owner of an original vessel hull identification number or
manufacturer's serial number for an engine or outboard
motor if the restoration is made by application to the
division or its authorized agent.
(b) This section does not prohibit any manufacturer
from placing, in the ordinary course of business, numbers
or marks upon vessels, motors, outboard motors, or parts.
1990

73-18-20.4. Duty to report falsified vessel o r m o t o r
number.
Any person owning or operating a marina, marine dealership, service station, public garage, paint shop, or a vessel
repair shop shall immediately notify the local police authorises of any vessel or outboard motor t h a t has any numbers t h a t
bave apparently been altered, obliterated, or removed.
1990

73-18-23

73-18-20.5. R e p o r t i n g of theft a n d r e c o v e r y of v e s s e l s .
(1) (a) Any peace officer upon receiving reliable information t h a t any vessel or outboard motor has been stolen
shall immediately report the theft to the Law Enforcem e n t and Technical Services Division of the Department
of Public Safety.
(b) Any peace officer upon receiving information that
any vessel or outboard motor which was previously reported as stolen has been recovered shall immediately
report the recovery to his law enforcement agency and to
the Law Enforcement and Technical Services Division.
(2) The reporting and recovery procedures for vessels and
outboard motors shall be the same as those specified in
Section 41-la-1401 for motor vehicles.
1993
73-18-20.6.

Report by o w n e r s or lienholders of thefts

and recoveries.
(1) The owner, or person having a lien or encumbrance upon
a registered vessel or outboard motor which has been stolen or
embezzled, may notify the law enforcement agency having
jurisdiction where the theft or embezzlement occurred. If a
vessel or outboard motor was embezzled, a report may be
made only after having procured the issuance of a warrant for
the arrest of the person charged with embezzlement.
(2) Any person who has given any notice under Subsection
(1) shall notify the law enforcement agency where the theft or
embezzlement was reported of a recovery of the vessel or
outboard motor.
1990
73-18-20.7. Unlawful control o v e r v e s s e l s — P e n a l t i e s
— Effect of prior c o n s e n t — Accessory or
accomplice.
(1) Any person who exercises unauthorized control over a
vessel, not his own, without the consent of the owner or lawful
custodian and with intent to temporarily deprive the owner or
lawful custodian of possession of the vessel, is guilty of a class
A misdemeanor.
(2) An offense under this section is a third degree felony if
the actor does not return the vessel to the owner or lawful
custodian within 24 hours after the exercise of unauthorized
control.
(3) The consent of the owner or legal custodian of a vessel to
its control by the actor is not in any case presumed or implied
because of the owner's or legal custodian's consent on a
previous occasion to the control of the vessel by the same or a
different person.
(4) Any person who assists in, or is a party or accessory to
or an accomplice in, an unauthorized taking or operating of a
vessel is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
1990
73-18-21. Violation of c h a p t e r as c l a s s B misdemeanor.
Unless otherwise specified, any person who violates any
provision of this chapter or rule promulgated under this
chapter is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.
1987
73-18-22. F u n d s collected — D i s p o s i t i o n .
All registration fees and related moneys collected by the
division, or any authorized agent, shall be deposited in the
Boating Account as restricted revenue in the General Fund of
the state, less the costs of collecting motorboat and sailboat
registration fees by any authorized agent. The amount retained by an authorized agent may not exceed 20% of the fees
charged in Section 73-18-7. The balance of the moneys may be
used for the construction, improvement, operation, and maintenance of state-owned boating facilities, for boater education,
and for the payment of the costs and expenses of the division
in administering and enforcing this chapter.
1990
73-18-23. Separability clause.
If any provision of this act, or the application of any
provision to any person or circumstance, is held invalid, the
rest of this act shall not be affected thereby.
1961
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